

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

3^D
DIVISION
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
IN THE
WORLD WAR



PREPARED BY THE
U.S. AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

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Foreword

THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was created by Congress in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American forces in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commission has erected suitable memorials in Europe and improved and beautified the eight American cemeteries there. It has also published a book entitled "American Armies and Battlefields in Europe" which gives a concise account of the vital part played by American forces in the World War and detailed information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.

In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately set forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each division which had front-line battle service. In certain cases studies of sector service were also prepared. It is felt that the results of this research should now be made available to the public. Therefore, these studies are being published in a series of twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to the operations of one division.

In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is treated in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensive enough to be of general interest and establish a great body of fact concerning the operations. For the military student, they provide an excellent background for tactical studies and present an extensive list of sources upon which further study can be based.

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION


CHAIRMAN

M221486

PREFACE

IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in mind that they are based on historical studies which were prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the purpose of determining the front line of each American division for each day of its active operations. Consequently, they were essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations of other arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations were covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of the infantry action.

The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the Commission was created, and every precaution was taken to insure that the research would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and thoroughness. A number of officers from the Regular Army as well as from the Marine Corps were selected and detailed to the Commission from time to time to carry on the work. All records of the War Department pertaining to the subject were exhaustively examined, as were the French, British and German documents which had been collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the daily front lines of each division were determined and plotted on large-scale maps, and brief accounts of the operations were prepared. The maps and accounts of operations were then referred to officers of the divisions concerned for comment and additional information. They were normally sent to officers of all ranks down to and including company commanders. In cases of doubtful or controversial points, the reference was carried further. The replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to correct and amplify the original studies. In this way, the Commission was able to secure and preserve valuable data which otherwise would have been lost.

In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond the scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength tables have been added and enough other material

has been included to present connected histories of the divisions from their organization until the conclusion of their service in Europe, and to portray their actions in proper relationship to the operations of the corps and armies with which they served.

In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the divisions served, a general map of France and Belgium has been included in each booklet. This map shows the principal cities and the battle lines of July 17 and November 11. In addition, it shows, by special symbol, certain localities of particular interest to the division concerned.

All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive; for example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10 and 11. Dates in the headings of chapters dealing with operations, and in the titles of accompanying maps, are in general the dates between which one or more infantry regiments of the division have been awarded battle honors by the War Department. In certain cases infantry regiments, as well as other elements of the division, have been awarded battle honors for dates other than those indicated. The dates on the battle lines of the maps include the period during which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight unless otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the line held at midnight, October 9.

The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by American forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it was necessary to use parts of two or more sheets of the wartime maps to make one operation map, which accounts for the different treatments of topographical detail often found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the maps in the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation appears in the front of each booklet. Names of certain topographical features which are well known, and are frequently referred to, appear in the text in the Anglicized form; for example, Argonne Forest rather than Forêt d'Argonne, Marne River rather than Marne Rivière.

The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records of The Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared, however, only for the periods of active operations. The

purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the division command during specific actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which were detached during the actions are not included, while casualties of elements of other divisions which were attached have been included. It will be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or on the maps. This was found necessary in order to include all casualties incident to entering or leaving the line.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A. E. F.—American Expeditionary Forces
B. (Bois)—wood
B. E. F.—British Expeditionary Forces
Chau. (Château)—chateau
Crx. (Croix)—cross
D. I. C. (Division d'Infanterie Coloniale)—Colonial Infantry
Division
excl.—exclusive
Fme. (Ferme)—farm
Fne. (Fontaine)—spring
Gd. (Grand)—large
G. H. Q.—General Headquarters
incl.—inclusive
Min. (Moulin)—mill
Rau., Rû (Ruisseau)—brook
Riv. (Rivière)—river
Sce. (Source)—source
Sigl. (Signal)—signal station
Ston. (Station)—station
Tr. (Tranchée)—trench
Use. (Usine)—factory

Organization, and Service from Arrival in the A. E. F. until May 31


THE 3D DIVISION, Regular Army, was organized in November 1917 with headquarters at Camp Greene, North Carolina. The Regular Army units, of which the division was composed, were at Camps Greene, North Carolina; Forrest, Georgia; Shelby, Mississippi; Stanley and Travis, Texas; Stuart, Virginia; Forts Bliss and Clark, Texas; Douglas, Utah; Leavenworth, Kansas; and Washington Barracks, District of Columbia. The elements of the division were never concentrated at one station before their departure for France. The 6th Engineers preceded the division to France, sailing from Hoboken, New Jersey, December 4-5, 1917. They landed at Brest and St. Nazaire, December 21-22. During the winter the division was brought to authorized strength by the assignment of selective service men from Camps Devens, Massachusetts; Dix, New Jersey; Lee, Virginia; Meade, Maryland; and Upton, New York. [1]¹

The principal units of the division were:

<i>5th Infantry Brigade</i>		<i>6th Infantry Brigade</i>	
4th Infantry Regiment		30th Infantry Regiment	
7th Infantry Regiment		38th Infantry Regiment	
8th Machine-Gun Battalion		9th Machine-Gun Battalion	
<i>3d Field Artillery Brigade</i>			
10th Field Artillery Regiment		76th Field Artillery Regiment	
(75-mm guns)		(75-mm guns)	
18th Field Artillery Regiment		3d Trench-Mortar Battery	
(155-mm howitzers)			
<i>Divisional Troops</i>			
7th Machine-Gun Battalion		6th Engineer Regiment	
5th Field Signal Battalion		Headquarters Troop	
Trains			

[1]

¹ The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to the sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All sources are listed in the appendix (p. 99).





The details of organization of the American infantry division were changed from time to time during the World War. Under the tables of organization which were in use in the American Expeditionary Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general, were in force during 1918, the maximum authorized strength of the division was 991 officers and 27,114 men. Its principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260 machine guns and 16,193 rifles. Further details concerning the composition of the American infantry division appear in the table on page 97. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown above. The actual strength of the 3d Division on certain dates is shown in the table on page 98. The approximate strength of the division for other dates may be obtained by applying to these figures the battle losses which appear in the casualty tables following the accounts of battle operations. [2]

On March 7 elements of the division began to move from their respective stations via Camps Merritt, New Jersey, and Stuart, Virginia, to the ports of embarkation of Halifax, Hoboken, Newport News and New York. From March 14 to April 30, the division sailed, landing at St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Brest, Liverpool and Glasgow. [1]

Following its arrival in France, the 3d Division, less artillery and engineers, moved to the 9th (Châteauvillain) Training Area for training. The artillery brigade upon its arrival in France was sent to Camp Coëtquidan for training. The division remained in the Châteauvillain Training Area until May 30, when it began to move to the vicinity of Château-Thierry. On May 31 it was assigned to the French XXXVIII Corps, French Sixth Army. [1]

The 6th Engineers in the Somme Defensive

SOMME DEFENSIVE, MARCH 21-APRIL 6

AFTER THE 6TH ENGINEERS arrived in France in December 1917, it served at first with the American Services of Supply. In February 1918 two companies of the regiment were sent to the British front for the purpose of constructing bridges, and were assigned to the British Fifth Army. [1, 8, 552]

On March 21 the Germans launched the first of their great offensives by which they hoped to win the war before the American army could take the field in force. This attack, the front of which included the point of junction of the British and French armies, was directed against the important railroad center of Amiens. Part of the principal German thrust struck the British Fifth Army, which was holding a front of about 50 kilometers to the north of the Oise River, and about 18 kilometers east of Péronne. The Allied and American action against this offensive is known as the Somme Defensive. [1, 3, 4, 6]



The following paragraph, in *italic*, is a synopsis of the service of the 6th Engineers, 3d Division, in the Somme Defensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

Elements of the 6th Engineers, 3d Division, serving with engineer units of the British Fifth Army along the Somme River near Péronne, were ordered to occupy a portion of the defensive position east of Amiens, following the launching of the German offensive on March 21. The detachment was part of "Carey's Force", which, besides the American contingent, consisted of various British and Canadian detachments. This force had orders to hold the Amiens Defense Line to the last. On March 27 the retreating British forces retired behind this line, which then became the front line. The detachment of the 6th Engineers was in con-

tact with the enemy near Warfusée-Abancourt and held its lines until its relief on the morning of April 3. The Somme Defensive closed on April 6.

Mar. On March 21, Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, and
21-26 Companies B and D, 6th Engineers, were in the rear area of the British Fifth Army. These units had been attached to the Fifth Army since February 11, having arrived on that date at Doingt, near Péronne. They served with the British 216th Army Troops Company, being engaged in heavy steel bridging operations along the Somme River and its tributaries near Péronne between the date of their arrival in the area and March 22. [7, 8]

Before the Germans launched the long expected offensive on March 21, the British Fifth Army had already instructed all army engineer units to assemble at the engineer park at Chaulnes, about 17 kilometers southeast of Warfusée-Abancourt, in case of emergency. On the day following the initial attack, the camp of the American units was subjected to shellfire and work had to be discontinued. At 11 p. m., March 22, orders were issued directing these units to withdraw to Chaulnes. Later they were ordered to assemble at Moreuil, about 15 kilometers south of Villers-Bretonneux. They remained at Moreuil on March 24 and 25. In the meantime the park at Chaulnes was demolished. [6, 8]

Owing to the rapid advance of the enemy, the British Fifth Army decided to assemble all available forces on the old French line, 13 kilometers in length, which was known as the Amiens Defense Line. A portion of this line extended north and south from a point about 1 kilometer west of Warfusée-Abancourt to Sailly-le-Sec. This line, which had been built by the French in 1916, was now in a poor state of repair and was partially filled in, as it had not been used since the German retirement in 1917. [9, 10]

At 11:30 p. m., March 25, a conference was held at headquarters, British Fifth Army, to arrange for troops to hold this line. About 3:30 a. m., March 26, the necessary orders were issued to the various units, totaling 2,200 troops. These

included British army troops, tunneling, workshop and electrical companies, detachments from five different schools and the units of the 6th Engineers. The force was named after its commander and was known as "Carey's Force". It was to hold the Amiens Defense Line to the last. In the event that the British XIX Corps should be forced to withdraw to this line, the withdrawing troops were to pass through the line, reorganize behind it under cover of the defenses, and assist in holding it. [10]

The danger that the British armies would be separated from the French armies was imminent. On the 25th, in order to meet this critical situation, all troops of the British Fifth Army were placed under the control of the French Group of Armies of the Reserve, and French troops were moved toward the area of the Fifth Army. On the 26th all the Allied forces were placed under one commander in order to coordinate the defense. [5, 6]

By 9:30 a. m., March 26, the 6th Engineers had been assigned a portion of the right sector of the line to the south of Warfusée-Abancourt. At this time the enemy was still several kilometers east of the line, but was driving steadily forward. [10]

On the morning of March 27, owing to a misunderstanding of orders, the right element of the British Third Army, which was to the left of the Fifth Army and north of the Somme River, retired to the line of the Ancre River. About 8:20 a. m. the enemy, following the retreating forces of the British Third Army, reached Sailly-le-Sec. In consequence, the left of the British Fifth Army, which at this hour was 8 kilometers east of Hamel, was exposed to fire from the north bank of the Somme, and was subject to the threat of a crossing by the enemy. To prevent a crossing, about 400 British troops on the left of the Amiens Defense Line near Warfusée-Abancourt were shifted as a flank guard to the line of the Somme. [9, 11]

Mar. 27

The units of the 6th Engineers were moved by truck about noon from the right of the Amiens Defense Line to the position thus vacated. The command occupied Bois des Tailloux and the north-south line west of Warfusée-Abancourt, with mixed

groups of British troops. The enemy crossed the Somme at Cérisy-Gailly, 5 kilometers east of Hamel. Threatened by these forces and by hostile groups advancing from the southeast near Morcourt, the British left-flank guard on the Somme withdrew in the evening of March 27 to the Amiens Defense Line. The enemy pressed forward in close pursuit, driving the British troops of the left corps of the Fifth Army behind the Amiens Defense Line. By 6 p. m. the enemy had occupied Warfusée-Abancourt, where patrols of the 6th Engineers were engaged during the night of March 27-28. [12, 13]

In the afternoon, reinforcements consisting of some 300 convalescents and 400 Canadian railway troops were sent into the sector to the right of the 6th Engineers. [9]

At 9 p. m. information was sent by the British Fifth Army to its XIX Corps, on the left, that the 1st Cavalry Division, VII Corps, the right element of the British Third Army, was being moved south of the Somme to positions in support of the Amiens Defense Line. [11]

During the night further provisions were made for meeting a continuance of the enemy attacks. [9]

Mar. 28-
Apr. 6

Throughout the morning of March 28 the front line of the British Fifth Army was west of the Amiens Defense Line, except on the front of the British 61st Division. At 11:30 a. m. this division made an unsuccessful attack north from Marcelcave, 3 kilometers southwest of Warfusée-Abancourt, with the latter town as the objective. Marcelcave was captured by the enemy in the late afternoon, but a new defense line was established west of the place. [9]

Slight readjustments of the units of the 6th Engineers were made during the day, but the Amiens Defense Line in this vicinity remained unchanged. [13]

On the morning of the 29th the enemy attacked the line north of Warfusée-Abancourt, but was repulsed. In the evening an enemy concentration in Ignaucourt, south of the Luce River and 3 kilometers south of Marcelcave, was observed. A further readjustment of Carey's Force was made in the right sector to meet a possible attack from this direction, but no change was made in the position of the 6th Engineers. [9, 13]

On the 30th the enemy attacked in force from Ignaucourt, crossed the Luce River at that point and drove the British line north to Bois de Hangard, 3 kilometers south of Villers-Bretonneux. A British counterattack regained 2 kilometers, reaching almost to the Luce. Attacks against the positions of the 6th Engineers were repulsed during the day. [9, 13]

During the night of March 30-31 the British 61st Division assumed command of the line south of the Amiens—St. Quentin road, the road which runs east and west through Warfusée-Abancourt. The British 1st Cavalry Division assumed command of the line north of this road. The detachment of the 6th Engineers continued to hold its positions under command of the latter division until relieved. [9, 13]

No further attacks in force were made on the front of the detachment of the 6th Engineers. It was relieved from the line early on the morning of April 3 and moved to Glisy, 8 kilometers west of Villers-Bretonneux. On the 4th it moved to Abbéville. The Somme Defensive closed on April 6, by which time the German offensive had been stopped. After the conclusion of the Somme Defensive, the detachment resumed bridge construction in the vicinity of Amiens. [1, 9, 13, 14, 15]

CASUALTIES, SOMME DEFENSIVE, 6TH ENGINEERS

	Mar. 21-26	Mar. 27- Apr. 3	Apr. 4-6	Total
6th Engrs.....				
{W.....	1	47	2	50
{DW.....		3		3
{K.....		25		25
Total.....	1	75	2	78

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action.

Aisne Defensive, Château-Thierry Sector, Champagne-Marne Defensive, Aisne- Marne Offensive and Vesle Sector

 AISNE DEFENSIVE, JUNE 1-5
CHÂTEAU-THIERRY SECTOR, JUNE 6-JULY 14
CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE, JULY 15-17
AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE, JULY 18-29 AND
 (6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE), AUGUST 3-6
VESLE SECTOR (6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE),
 AUGUST 7-11

THE LINES in the vicinity of Amiens had scarcely stabilized when, on April 9, the Germans launched a second offensive farther north. This attack drove a salient into the British lines along the Lys River, in the vicinity of Armentières. Another blow was directed against the French, when on May 27, the Germans attacked between Berry-au-Bac, approximately 17 kilometers northwest of Reims, and the Oise River. The attack came as a complete surprise. The Germans broke through the French lines, crossed the Aisne, Vesle and Ourcq Rivers, and drove rapidly to the Marne. Upon reaching the Marne River, they used that stream to protect their southern flank, and turned westward toward Paris. The action against this offensive is known as the Aisne Defensive. [1, 3, 16]

While the offensives by which the Germans hoped to win the war before the American army could take the field in force failed to accomplish their purpose, they strained the Allies to the limit of their reserves, and made it necessary to send American divisions to different parts of the front for immediate service with the British and French armies. It was under these circumstances that the 3d Division was placed at the disposal of the French for the purpose of holding the crossings of the Marne at Château-Thierry. [3]

The following paragraphs, in *italic*, are a synopsis of the service of the 3d Division in the Aisne Defensive, Château-Thierry Sector, Champagne-Marne Defensive, Aisne-Marne Offensive and the Vesle Sector. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

Elements of the 3d Division entered the line at Château-Thierry on May 31, and, operating with the French XXXVIII Corps, French Sixth Army, assisted in holding the crossings of the Marne River. On June 2 and 3 other units of the division arrived and entered the line, under French command, at widely separated points east and west of Château-Thierry.

Elements of the division west of Château-Thierry attacked as part of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division on June 6, 7 and 8 and made gains on the southern slopes of Hill 204. The 3d Division took command of a defensive sector along the Marne River east of Château-Thierry on June 6 and the process of reassembling the division was begun. The limits of the sector were extended from time to time, so that on July 14 the division held a 10-kilometer front along the Marne.

On July 15 the Germans launched another offensive, the western flank of which crossed the Marne River near Mézy and Varennes on the front of the 38th and 30th Infantry Regiments and entered the sector of the 7th Infantry of the 3d Division. The attempts of two German divisions to pierce the front of the 3d Division were defeated in the outpost zone. A German penetration to the right of the 3d Division caused the withdrawal of the 38th Infantry from the riverbank late in the afternoon. This regiment took up a position in the Surmelin valley, facing east. The outpost zone of the 30th Infantry having been penetrated by the enemy, this regiment withdrew to a line of resistance a short distance to the rear. The enemy subsequently withdrew to the north bank of the Marne during the night.

The 111th Infantry, 28th Division, was attached to the 3d Division and on July 16 advanced to the high ground between Crézancy and Fossoy. On the 17th the line was reestablished along the Marne River west of Mézy. The 38th Infantry reoccupied Paroy and Launay on the 18th.

Owing to the successful counteroffensive launched southwest of Soissons on July 18 by American and French troops, the Germans abandoned the gains made in the July 15 attack south of the Marne and east of the sector of the 3d Division, and withdrew to the north bank during the night of July 19-20. On July 19 they had decided to evacuate the Marne salient. This evacuation commenced on the night of July 20-21.

The right of the 3d Division moved forward to the Marne on July 20. The 4th Infantry crossed the river on July 21 and occupied Mont St. Père and part of Bois de Barbillon. The 38th and 7th Infantry Regiments crossed the river during the night of July 21-22 and joined in the attack on July 22. The 38th Infantry advanced to Le Charmel, but later withdrew to Jaulgonne. The 4th Infantry captured Moulin Doly and was then passed through by the 7th Infantry which captured La Théoderie. On July 23 the 4th and 7th Infantry Regiments occupied La Tieulerie Ferme and that part of Bois de Mont l'Evêque within the divisional zone.

During the night of July 23-24 the enemy withdrew to Le Charmel. On July 24 the 30th Infantry advanced to the east and north of Argentol and the southwestern edge of Le Charmel. The 4th Infantry advanced to wood No. 10, southwest of Le Charmel. The 7th Infantry relieved the 30th Infantry on July 25 and the 4th Infantry captured Le Charmel. There was no change in the front on July 26.

The enemy withdrew to the line of the Ourcq River during the night of July 26-27 and was pursued by the 3d Division on July 27. That night the 4th Infantry occupied the front on a line extending from Villardelle Ferme to Cote 190, southeast of Courmont. On the 28th the 4th Infantry crossed the Ourcq and captured Ronchères. On the 29th an unsuccessful attack on Bois des Grimpettes advanced the line about 300 meters to Hill 226 and Les 18 Arpents ravine.

The 3d Division was relieved on this line by the 32d Division during the night of July 29-30, and assembled as reserve of the French XXXVIII Corps in the vicinity of Château-Thierry. On August 2 the 6th Infantry Brigade was attached to the French III Corps.

The American III Corps took command of the zone of the French III Corps on August 5.

The 6th Infantry Brigade entered the front line east of Fismes on August 6, relieving French troops, and made unsuccessful attempts to establish bridgeheads north of the Vesle River on August 7 and 10. It was relieved by the French 164th Division on the night of August 10-11 and returned to control of the 3d Division.

When the German attack of May 27 was launched, the 3d Division was in the Châteauvillain Training Area, about 160 kilometers southeast of Château-Thierry. On May 30 the division, less artillery and engineers, was placed at the disposal of the French Group of Armies of the North for the purpose of defending the passages of the Marne River from Château-Thierry to Damery, some 35 kilometers to the east. [17, 18]

May
30-31

At 10:30 a. m., May 30, the 7th Machine-Gun Battalion, motorized, was ordered to move at once by road to Condé-en-Brie, about 12 kilometers southeast of Château-Thierry, where it was to report to the French for further orders. The remainder of the division, less motor transportation, was to move by rail to Montmirail, 25 kilometers southeast of Château-Thierry, from where it was to be deployed to defend the Marne crossings. The 7th Infantry was to go to Château-Thierry, the 38th Infantry to Ablois-St. Martin, the 4th and 30th Infantry Regiments to Condé-en-Brie, the 8th Machine-Gun Battalion to Crézancy, the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion to Ablois-St. Martin and Condé-en-Brie, and the 5th Field Signal Battalion to Condé-en-Brie. The motorized trains were to move to Bar-sur-Aube, protected by an advance guard and flank patrols on motorcycles. [18, 19, 20]

The 7th Machine-Gun Battalion left La Ferté-sur-Aube at 2:30 p. m., May 30, and arrived at Château-Thierry late in the evening of May 31. At this time the Germans were entering the northern outskirts of the town. [13, 21, 22]

Under the personal instructions of the commander of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division, the 1st Section of Company A (two guns) was ordered across the river. Preceded by French infantry, which drove out the hostile advance posts,

it went into position about 300 meters northeast of the bridge by which the road from the south crosses the north branch of the river. This position was held in conjunction with French infantry until the following day. The remainder of the guns of the battalion were placed along the south bank of the river from the same bridge to a point about 1,600 meters to the east. They were sited to cover the bridges which were then being prepared for demolition. [13, 23]

June 1

On June 1 the enemy, having already reached the Marne east of Château-Thierry, isolated that portion of the town north of the river by an advance to the west which resulted in the capture of Vaux and the slopes of Hill 204. The section of Company A, 7th Machine-Gun Battalion, north of the river, was ordered to withdraw with the French troops to the south bank about 11 p. m. The withdrawal was made by way of the railroad bridge, to the east, because the main stone bridge in the town was blown up before the troops could reach it. The Germans entered the town and occupied the north bank of the Marne during the evening. The 7th Machine-Gun Battalion held the crossings of the river in conjunction with French infantry. The sector was extended to the west end of the island. [13, 23, 24]

Machine-gun units of the 3d Division remained in the town of Château-Thierry under French command until July 17, reliefs and changes of position being made by the 7th, 8th and 9th Machine-Gun Battalions during that time. On June 11 the sector was extended to the railroad bridge southwest of Château-Thierry. [25]

The French Group of Armies of the North assigned the 3d Division to the French Sixth Army, which in turn assigned it to the French XXXVIII Corps. Taking up a position along the Marne, the center of this corps was marked by a line from east of Mont St. Père to Fossoy. The corps was without contact with units to its flanks and was organizing its sector with whatever troops were available. It planned to use the 7th Infantry, 5th Infantry Brigade, in the right sector and the 38th Infantry, 6th Infantry Brigade, in the left sector. The two remaining regiments of the division, the 4th and 30th Infantry Regiments, were to be held in corps reserve. [26, 27, 28, 29]

In transmitting these instructions, the 3d Division ordered the 7th Infantry and the 8th Machine-Gun Battalion to report to the right sector and the 38th Infantry and the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion to the left sector. At this time the division did not control its regiments. [30]

All elements of the 5th and 6th Infantry Brigades reported to the French on June 2 and 3. As the battalions arrived they were assigned to widely scattered positions in the French XXXVIII Corps. [17]

June
2-3

During the night of June 2-3 the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, with Company A, 8th Machine-Gun Battalion attached, under orders of the French 20th Division, took over the front line along the Marne in the vicinity of Courthiézy from a point about 1 kilometer southeast of Tréloup to Sauvigny. [31, 32]

During the same night the 38th Infantry, operating under the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division, placed two companies of the 2d Battalion in line near Fossoy, from a point about 1 kilometer southwest of Mont St. Père to a point about 700 meters west of Fossoy, relieving French units. [13, 33, 34]

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 30th Infantry, were attached to the left subsector of the corps. In the afternoon of June 3 the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, took up a support position at Mont du Bonheil on the north bank of the Marne, 5 kilometers southwest of Château-Thierry, under orders of the French 4th Cavalry Division. The 4th Infantry and the remainder of the 30th Infantry formed the corps reserve. [13, 35, 36, 37]

During the night of June 3-4 the 6th Infantry Brigade extended west along the Marne to a point about 600 meters southeast of Brasles, the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, relieving elements of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division in this area. [38, 39]

The Commanding General of the 3d Division was assigned to the command of the French XXXVIII Corps reserve, which now consisted of the 4th Infantry, the 30th Infantry, less two battalions, one regiment of French Territorials, one regiment of French cavalry and two companies of French engineers. [40]

On June 4 the 7th Machine-Gun Battalion was relieved in

June 4 Château-Thierry by Company A, 9th Machine-Gun Battalion, and a French unit. It moved to corps reserve. [40, 41]

Companies C and D, 30th Infantry, joined a mixed Franco-American detachment guarding the Marne bridges between Charly and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, about 17 kilometers southwest of Château-Thierry. These units were not in the front line. [42, 43]

The French XXXVIII Corps reorganized its area into three sectors: the right and left front-line sectors already mentioned, and the "Sector of the Banks of the Marne" in which were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 30th Infantry. [44]

June 5 The Aisne Defensive ended on June 5. The enemy had made a penetration of over 50 kilometers and had created a salient in the French lines, marked on the east by Reims, on the south by Château-Thierry and on the west by Soissons. [5]

During the night of June 5-6 Company E, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, which had been holding a support line at Mont du Bonneil, advanced and took over the section of the front line about 600 meters south of Monneaux, relieving a French cyclist company. Contact was established with troops of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division to the right, and with the American 9th Infantry, 2d Division, to the left. [13, 48]

At 5 p.m. the French XXXVIII Corps issued instructions for the reorganization of the sector, which was to be held by the French 20th, American 3d and French 10th Colonial Infantry Divisions, from right to left. The limits of the American sector were to be:

Right boundary: west edge of Bois de la Jute—Crézancy (incl.)—railroad station at Mézy (incl.).

Left boundary: Nesles (excl.)—les Evaux (excl.).

Troops assigned to the 3d Division were the American 38th and 4th Infantry Regiments, the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion, two battalions of French Colonials, eight batteries of French artillery and one half of a French engineer company. [45]

Arrangements were to be made to replace the 4th Infantry by the 30th Infantry in order to assemble the American 6th Infantry Brigade. The 7th Infantry and 8th Machine-Gun Battalion remained in the sector of the French 20th Division,

and the 30th Infantry in the sector of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division. Necessary infantry movements were to be completed by 2 p. m., June 6, at which time command was to pass to the 3d Division. [45]

The 3d Division took over a portion of the Château-Thierry Sector on June 6, as prescribed by the French XXXVIII Corps, and commenced the work of organizing for defense with the mission of stopping any attempts by the enemy to cross the river and of driving back any who succeeded in crossing. The 6th Infantry Brigade took command of the front. The front line of defense was to be as close as possible to the river. A line of supports for the first line and a base for counterattacks was to be established along the line, Crézancy—Bois d'Aigremont—wood east of Blesmes—Hill 186—Nesles and wood to the east. [46]

June 6

The 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, took over the front line in the vicinity of Mézy during the night of June 6-7. French troops continued to hold a small portion of the front near Barrage Ecluse. [13, 47]

During the night of June 6-7 Company E, 30th Infantry, engaged in an attack on Monneaux in connection with an attack on Hill 204 by troops of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division. The American 9th Infantry, 2d Division, was ordered to advance its right in conforming to the movement. The line was advanced about 1 kilometer. Company E, 30th Infantry, passed through Monneaux and established the line to the northeast, in contact with troops to both flanks. [13, 48, 49, 50]

The French 10th Colonial Infantry Division was ordered to capture Hill 204 as soon as possible. This operation was executed by the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, in conjunction with a battalion of the 10th Colonial Infantry Division, to the right. The attack was to be made at 9 p. m., June 7, at which time Company E was to hold its position north of Monneaux and Company F was to pass through the line and attack the west and southwest edge of Bois de la Cote 204. [13, 50, 51]

June 7

The attack started on time, but after progressing a short distance, was ordered delayed an hour. The advance was

resumed about 10 p. m. and at midnight the attack was still in progress. [13, 52]

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and Company A, 8th Machine-Gun Battalion, in the front line near Courthiézy, were relieved by the French during the night of June 7-8, and moved back to a support position near Janvier Ferme. [31, 53]

June
8-14

By noon, June 8, Company F, 30th Infantry, had partially gained its objective, though the northwest edge of Bois de la Cote 204 had not been reached. Midnight June 8 found the company with two platoons in the southwest edge of the wood and two platoons between Company E and Vaux. This line was outposted, and was in contact with the troops to the right and left. [13, 52]

The period June 8-14 was spent in making the changes necessary to reassemble the elements of the 6th Infantry Brigade. The battalions of the 30th Infantry were to be relieved by battalions of the 4th Infantry. [17, 55]

In a relief within the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division, the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was relieved on Hill 204 about 4 a. m., June 9, by a battalion of the French 52d Colonial Infantry. This battalion rejoined the 6th Infantry Brigade on June 14. The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, reported to the brigade on June 10 and took over the line held by the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, near Mézy on June 12. The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, rejoined the 6th Infantry Brigade on June 11. [56, 57, 58]

During the night of June 8-9 the 2d Battalion and Machine-Gun Company, 7th Infantry, relieved troops of the French 20th Division in the front line near Reuilly from Sauvigny to a point 750 meters north of Reuilly. This position was held until the night of June 10-11, when they were relieved by the French. The 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, relieved troops of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division in the front line in the woods on Hill 204 during the night of June 13-14, holding this position until withdrawn during the night of June 17-18. [13, 31, 59]

The relief of the 7th Infantry from the front line in the sector of the French 20th Division was accomplished so that the regi-

ment could be moved to the west and used to guard the Marne bridges between Charly and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. The move was completed on June 11 and the regiment was attached to the French 164th Division, French XXI Corps. [13, 60, 61]

On June 11 the 6th Engineers reported to the division for duty. The French XXXVIII Corps relieved the French engineer detachment on duty with the Americans and took one American engineer battalion for work on the second defensive position. On the same day the corps ordered the 3d Division to obtain information of the enemy situation by sending reconnaissance patrols north of the river. [1, 62, 63]

On June 14 the 3d Division announced a reorganization of its sector into two subsectors, to be held by the 30th Infantry on the right and 38th Infantry on the left. Two lines of defense were to be prepared. The first, which was to be held in case of attack, was a line, Moulins—northern edge of the wood northwest of Crézancy—Fossoy—Hill 186—Etampes. Observation posts were to be established in front of this line along the south bank of the river. The second line of defense was to be, Laignay—le Rocq Ferme et Château—Fontaine aux Charmes—Nesles. [64]

On June 15 the French Sixth Army announced a readjustment of its sector. The 3d Division was to extend to the left to the east exit of Château-Thierry. In order to hold the widened front, the 4th Infantry was to be returned to the division. The 7th Infantry was placed at the disposal of the American 2d Division, under which it operated until June 23. [65, 66]

June
15-18

Companies G and H, 30th Infantry, relieved the French in the vicinity of Chierry during the night of June 16-17, thus extending the sector of the 3d Division to Château-Thierry, exclusive. Companies G and H, 30th Infantry, were relieved by Companies L and M, 4th Infantry, on the night of June 18-19. [13, 67, 68, 69]

On June 17 the 30th Infantry completed the relief of the French units remaining near Barrage Ecluse and took over that part of the 38th Infantry's sector northwest of Fossoy. The divisional sector was now held, from right to left, by the 30th, 38th and 4th Infantry Regiments. These dispositions were confirmed in a defense plan issued by the 3d Division on June

18 to cover the change in sectors. Patrols secured identifications and prisoners on the north bank of the Marne during the period of readjustment of the sector. [70, 71, 72]

*June 19-
July 3*

The line of the 3d Division was held with routine reliefs and shifting of units until July 3, during which time the construction of defensive works was pushed. Patrols crossed the Marne and captured additional prisoners. [73]

The French 39th Division ordered the relief of the French 10th Colonial Infantry Division, to the left of the 3d Division, on June 27. The French 125th Division ordered the relief of the French 20th Division, to the right, on June 28. [74, 75]

The 7th Infantry was placed under the control of the French XXXVIII Corps on June 28 and returned to the 3d Division on July 1 for front-line service. The divisional sector was extended to a point about 1 kilometer west of Varennes on July 3, and reorganized with the line held, from right to left, by the 6th and 5th Infantry Brigades with the 38th, 30th, 7th and 4th Infantry Regiments. This brought the organic elements of the brigades under their proper commands. Elements of the machine-gun battalions still remained with the French, while French artillery supported the 3d Division. [76, 77, 78, 79, 80]

*July
4-14*

During the period July 4-14 the sector was held with routine reliefs, without change in the order of regiments. Work on defensive positions was pushed. [13, 81]

On July 8 the French 125th Division was transferred to the French III Corps. The 3d Division thus became the right division of the French XXXVIII Corps. [82]

The 3d Field Artillery Brigade began to arrive on July 5, on which date the first batteries of the 76th Field Artillery went into position in the sector of its division. This regiment completed its movement on the following day; the 10th Field Artillery during the night of July 11-12; the 1st Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, on the night of July 13-14, and the remainder of this regiment was moving to positions on the night of July 14-15. [83]

The German troops in the Marne salient were in an unfavorable situation. Their only rail communication was the railroad through Soissons, which lay close to the west face of the

salient, and would be cut by an Allied penetration in this area. On June 9 the Germans had made an unsuccessful attempt to widen the salient to the west and bring their lines closer to Paris by attacking between Montdidier and Noyon, about 35 kilometers northwest of Soissons. After the failure of the Montdidier-Noyon Offensive, they made plans to improve their situation by widening the salient to the east. One attack was to be launched east of Reims in the direction of Châlons-sur-Marne, east of Epernay, and one southwest of Reims in the direction of Epernay. These converging attacks, if successful, would turn the Allied positions about Reims on both flanks. Thus the Germans would gain dominating positions south of Reims and the important railroad communications through the city itself. It was also anticipated that the French troops defending Paris might be separated from those in the vicinity of Verdun. [3, 5, 54, 84]

By this time, however, a sufficient number of American troops had arrived in France to permit the Allies to assume the offensive. Plans for an Allied and American attack against the Marne salient were prepared which were designed to take advantage of the faulty enemy communications. The French Tenth Army was to deliver the main attack. It was to drive eastward south of Soissons and cut the German communications through that place. In conjunction with this attack, the French Fifth Army was to attack the east face of the salient. Between these armies, the French Sixth Army was to apply pressure at the tip of the salient, and support with its left the main attack of the French Tenth Army. It was contemplated that a number of American divisions would be used in this offensive. [3, 5, 89, 90, 91]

While preparations for this Allied and American offensive were being made, the German plans for their attacks east and southwest of Reims were discovered. The decision by the Germans to attack at these points was fortunate for their opponents, since it allowed the Allied and American attack, already planned, to be delivered as a counterstroke. Preparations were therefore made to meet the German attacks and to launch the counterattack as soon as the Germans had been

definitely checked. The French were able to secure very definite information concerning the German plans. By July 7 they had learned that the offensive would involve the French Fourth Army in the Champagne east of Reims, and the French Fifth and Sixth Armies southwest of the city. On July 11 they were able to establish the approximate date upon which the offensive would be launched. [3, 5, 87, 88, 89]

The necessary installations for the counteroffensive and the concentration of troops were observed by the Germans prior to July 15. However, the latter believed that Allied reserves would be so depleted in resisting the German attack that danger of an Allied attack would not exist after July 15. [92]

July 15 The German offensive was launched shortly after midnight July 14. The action against this offensive is known as the Champagne-Marne Defensive. When the attack began, the 3d Division was holding the sector along the Marne with all infantry regiments in line; the 38th Infantry to Mézy (excl.); 30th Infantry to Le Rû Chailly Ferme (incl.); 7th Infantry to Blesmes (excl.); 4th Infantry to the divisional boundary just east of Château-Thierry. [93]

There were several defensive lines. The outpost zone consisted of a line of observation posts along the Marne and a series of strongpoints in the vicinity of the railroad track. The position of resistance included two defensive lines; the Aqueduct Line on the northern slope of the hills overlooking the river, and the Woods Line running through Janvier Ferme—le Souvrien Ferme—le Rocq Ferme et Château—Fontaine aux Charmes. Farther to the rear, the French Sixth Army was organizing still another line. [13, 94]

At midnight, July 14, the 6th Infantry Brigade, on the right, was deployed as follows:

<i>30TH INFANTRY</i>	<i>38TH INFANTRY</i>
<i>(Outpost Zone)</i>	<i>(Outpost Zone)</i>
Companies B and C	Companies G, H and E
	Company F
<i>(Aqueduct Line)</i>	<i>(Aqueduct Line)</i>
Companies A, K and D	Companies B and D

<i>(Woods Line)</i> Remainder of the regiment, plus Companies A and C, 38th Infantry	<i>(Woods Line)</i> Remainder of the regiment, less Companies A and C
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Elements of the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion and the 6th Engineers were distributed throughout the brigade in support of the infantry. [13, 95, 96]

On the left, the 5th Infantry Brigade was deployed as follows:

4TH INFANTRY <i>(Outpost Zone)</i> 2d Battalion, plus Company B	7TH INFANTRY <i>(Outpost Zone)</i> Companies M, L and I being relieved by 2d Battalion
<i>(Aqueduct Line)</i> 1st Battalion, less Company B, plus Company I	<i>(Aqueduct Line)</i> Companies D and K
<i>(Woods Line)</i> 3d Battalion, less Company I	<i>(Woods Line)</i> Companies A, B and C

Elements of the 8th Machine-Gun Battalion and the 6th Engineers were distributed throughout the brigade in support of the infantry. The 7th Machine-Gun Battalion was in corps reserve. [13, 97, 98, 99]

The German 10th Landwehr Division held the front opposite the 3d Division. It was to remain in place while the German 36th and 10th Divisions passed through its lines, crossed the Marne and made the attack. The approximate boundary between the divisions at the start of the attack was to be Le Surmelin Ruisseau, with the 10th Division on the west and the 36th Division on the east. The objective in the sector of the 3d Division was a line, point 2 kilometers south of St. Eugène—Grèves Ferme—le Rocq Ferme et Château—east of l'Herben-

nerie—Gland, the west limit of the front of the attack. The formation of the attacking divisions was to be as follows:

German 36th Division

128th Infantry 5th Grenadiers
175th Infantry

German 10th Division

6th Grenadiers 398th Infantry
47th Infantry

The German 36th Division was to cross the Marne east of Courtemont-Varennnes and west of Varennes, and attack in a southwesterly direction. The 10th Division was to cross the river in front of Mézy and Le Rû Chailly Ferme, outflank Fossoy from the east and capture Bois d'Aigremont. [100, 101, 102, 103]

The offensive was to open with a heavy bombardment starting at 12:10 a. m., July 15. At 1:50 a. m. the construction of bridges and ferries across the Marne was to start. The infantry was to cross by these facilities as soon as they were ready and advance behind a rolling barrage, which was to start from the railroad at 3:50 a. m. [103, 104, 105]

The time of the impending attack was learned from prisoners captured early in the evening of July 14 by the French Fourth Army. This information was distributed to all concerned in time for the Allied artillery to open fire by midnight, July 14. At 11:25 p. m., July 14, the 3d Division was ordered to lay an artillery counterpreparation on the Marne and on enemy routes of approach. This fire commenced about 11:45 p. m. and continued for a half hour. The German bombardment began as scheduled at 12:10 a. m. [83, 106, 107]

On the right, Company E, 38th Infantry, defeated all attempts of the German 36th Division to cross the river in its front. This division had suffered severely from the American and French counterpreparation; nevertheless, it succeeded in crossing in force in the sector of the French 125th Division to the east, and advanced rapidly to the south and southwest of Varennes. By 4 a. m. the German 5th Grenadier Regiment was advancing along the road and around the foot of the hill just east of Moulins, in rear of Company E, 38th Infantry. Company F, 38th Infantry, advanced to meet them at 4:30 a. m. and, after several counterattacks, succeeded in holding the hill-

side east of Moulins. On the crest of the ridge, east of Moulin Ruiné Signal, the Germans pressed to the south. At 5:15 a. m. Company B, 38th Infantry, ordered its working details in the vicinity of Paroy to be ready for immediate action. The enemy was observed debouching from the wood northeast of Paroy, and Company B, with part of Company D, took up a position south of Launay, where they became engaged in a fire fight. At 5:55 a. m. the 1st Battalion ordered Companies B and D to occupy the Aqueduct Line. They moved out about 7 a. m., passing through Paroy, and during the forenoon counter-attacked against the German 175th Infantry near Moulin Ruiné Signal, advancing some distance to the east of that point and clearing that part of the sector of the 3d Division. [13, 95, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111]

The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, which had been alerted early in the morning, occupied the Woods Line north and northeast of Connigis. During the forenoon the battalion became engaged and drove off enemy troops who had penetrated into the ravine east of Launay. [112]

At 10:37 a. m. the right wing of the German 36th Division had been driven back to the line, Moulin Ruiné Signal—western edge of Varennes—northwest to the river. The enemy ordered his reserves to move from Reuilly and Sauvigny and attack west toward Le Surmelin Ruisseau. [107]

In the German 10th Division, the 6th Grenadier Regiment crossed the Marne on both sides of Mézy on the front of Company G, 38th Infantry, and Company C, 30th Infantry. The south bank of the river was reached by 2:40 a. m. and at 3:30 a. m. the enemy held the railroad embankment to the east of the Mézy railroad station under heavy fire from the front and flanks. At 4:15 a. m. this force was counterattacked by Companies G and H, 38th Infantry, and driven back across the river, the remnants of the regiment reaching the north bank at 5 a. m. West of Mézy some Germans infiltrated as far as the railroad, but the village was held until later in the morning by a platoon of Company C, 30th Infantry, and two machine guns of the Machine-Gun Company, 30th Infantry. [13, 113, 114, 115]

Farther to the west, the German 398th Infantry assembled on the north bank of the Marne at midnight and shortly thereafter started to cross on the front of Company B, 30th Infantry, by means of ferries and bridges. The German regiment employed two battalions in the front line and one in support. By 4 a. m. the crossing had been effected and the advance to the railroad taken up. Heavy losses were sustained from the American counterpreparation fire and in crossing the river. As a result, its support battalion had to be placed in the center of the line. The railroad was reached, and by 5 a. m. the regiment was prepared for another advance. Both flanks were exposed. [114, 116]

This advance overran the forward elements of Company B, 30th Infantry. However, detachments of the Machine-Gun Company, 30th Infantry, still held out near the destroyed bridge below Mont St. Père and on the railroad west of Le Rû Chailly Ferme. Elements of the 7th Infantry held their positions near the farm. A platoon of Company I, 7th Infantry, had been relieved at the farm by a platoon of Company F before midnight, and had started for the rear, but during the early morning returned to the position. [13, 97, 116, 117]

The German 47th Infantry, in reserve of the German 10th Division, was ordered to follow the attacking regiments and cross the river on a bridge that was being built at the eastern end of Mont St. Père island, in front of Company C, 30th Infantry. After being delayed a short time while the bridge was completed, the 1st Battalion crossed the river at 4 a. m. Elements of Company C, 30th Infantry, inflicted such heavy losses on it that the advance was stopped about 200 meters south of the river and the survivors retreated to the north bank. [13, 118, 119, 120]

On account of the delay in completing the bridge, the 3d Battalion, German 47th Infantry, was ordered to cross at a ferry west of Mézy. On leaving the eastern outskirts of Mont St. Père, it came under artillery fire and such heavy machine-gun fire from the vicinity of the ruined bridge and Mézy that the ferry could not be reached, and the battalion scattered in the woods north of Chartèves. [118, 121]

The 2d Battalion, German 47th Infantry, was ordered to follow the 1st Battalion across the bridge at Mont St. Père. Seeing that the 1st Battalion was being driven back by Company C, 30th Infantry, the 2d Battalion halted at the southern edge of Mont St. Père and sent its machine-gun company to the river to assist the 1st Battalion. [118, 119]

Shortly after 5 a. m. the German 398th Infantry attacked from the railroad. The 1st Battalion was sent against the elements of the 30th and 7th Infantry Regiments that were enfilading the line from the south. This advance outflanked the position at Le Rû Chailly Ferme, but by 9 a. m. it was stopped by elements of Companies I and F, 7th Infantry, at the northern edge of Fossoy and the woods to the east. The 2d and 3d Battalions, German 398th Infantry, advanced southeast, but were stopped a short distance in front of the positions held by Companies D, K and A, 30th Infantry. One patrol entered the woods east of Fossoy and the woods south of L'Herbennerie, while another reached the woods north of Crézancy. This latter position, on the Aqueduct Line, had been evacuated by Company D, 30th Infantry, under the belief that it was outflanked. By 9 a. m. all offensive action of the German 398th Infantry Regiment ceased and it made plans to hold the ground gained. [13, 97, 116, 117, 122]

About 9 a. m. the 3d Division attached the 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, less Company I to the 30th Infantry. It was promptly put on the march to Bois d'Aigremont. [123, 124]

The two battalions of the 7th Infantry, the 2d and 3d, which had been caught in the bombardment in the midst of a relief, initiated plans to hold the position and prevent a farther enemy advance to the west. A line extending from the main highway east of Fossoy along the eastern and northern edges of Fossoy to the railroad embankment northwest of the town was established during the morning by units of both battalions. [13, 125]

At 8:10 a. m. the 2d and 3d Battalions, German 47th Infantry, were ordered to cross the river west of Le Rû Chailly Ferme. They were then to attack northeast against the positions held by elements of Companies B and C, 30th Infantry, along

the railroad and in the woods to the north of the railroad. At the same time the survivors of the 1st Battalion were to attack from the north. [118]

On account of the exposed route of march from Mont St. Père to the crossing, the orders were changed, and the two battalions were ordered to cross at the Mont St. Père bridge and enter the line between the 6th Grenadiers and the 398th Infantry. It was not then known to the Germans that the 6th Grenadiers had been forced back across the river. [118]

The 2d Battalion, German 47th Infantry, crossed the Marne about 8:45 a. m. and began to advance toward the railroad, extending its front to gain contact with the 6th Grenadiers to the east and the 398th Infantry to the west. The 3d Battalion did not cross at this time. [118, 126]

This attack was opposed by platoons of Company C and the Machine-Gun Company, 30th Infantry, which were still holding the riverbank and the patches of woods as far back as the railroad. In the meantime these platoons had been taken in the rear by the advance of the German 398th Infantry to the high ground to the south, and were fired on by their own supporting artillery. The platoons retired, capturing a large detachment of the German 47th Infantry along the railroad west of Mézy and another group of the enemy in the fields south of Mézy. [13, 120, 127]

The movement of the German 47th Infantry toward Mézy was also opposed by machine guns of the 30th Infantry in Mézy, and by a detachment in the vicinity of the railroad station composed of the Stokes-Mortar Platoon and a platoon of Company C, 30th Infantry. These troops had withdrawn from Mézy about 8 a. m. and had taken up a position along the railroad between the station and the road leading in from the south, where they were joined by part of Company G, 38th Infantry, about 10:30 a. m. The combined force held the position around the southern outskirts of Mézy until 4:30 p. m., repulsing efforts of the German 47th Infantry to extend to the east. [13, 117, 128]

At 11 a. m. the German 398th Infantry was attacked on the flanks by the detachments near Mézy and Fossoy and was

forced to withdraw to the line of the railroad. This movement was completed at 2 p. m., except for a detachment of machine guns which was left at Le Rû Chailly Ferme. Contact was established with the 2d Battalion, German 47th Infantry, which had reached the railroad about 12:15 p. m. and was in position there with its left company refused to face Mézy. [114, 116]

Shortly before this enemy withdrawal started, Company K, 30th Infantry, withdrew from the woods northwest of Crézancy to the Woods Line in the northern part of Bois d'Aigremont. During the late afternoon Company A, 30th Infantry, withdrew from its position in the woods east and southeast of Le Rû Chailly Ferme and moved to a position in reserve. These withdrawals left the Aqueduct Line unoccupied in the sector of the 30th Infantry. [117, 129, 130]

On the right of the 3d Division, the action of the 38th Infantry threatened the right flank of the German 36th Division. At 2:50 p. m. the latter placed the three battalions of the 175th Infantry in front line and asked for reinforcements. The 372d Infantry, 10th Landwehr Division, was ordered to cross the river at Passy-sur-Marne and push forward in the direction of Le Surmelin Ruisseau. [107]

Later in the afternoon the German 36th Division continued its attack against the right flank of the 38th Infantry with three regiments in line, but at the end of the day it had been unable to capture the western slope of the high ridge south of Varennes or to drive the Americans beyond the Surmelin. [107, 131]

During the afternoon the forward companies of the 38th Infantry remained in their original positions along the railroad and on the hill at Moulin Ruiné Signal, while the 3d Battalion held its position on the Woods Line. Company M, on the extreme right of the battalion, organized a line facing east toward Les Etangs Ferme and repulsed an attack when the French lost the farm during the afternoon. The next company to the left, Company L, also became engaged with Germans who entered the ravine east of Launay. [13, 95, 112, 132, 133]

At 2:15 p. m. the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, was ordered to withdraw one company from the vicinity of Moulin Ruiné

Signal and place it in position along the west bank of Le Surmelin Ruisseau north of Crézancy, facing east. Company D took up this position and held it until about 8 p. m. [13, 134, 135]

At 2:20 p. m. the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, was ordered to withdraw to the Aqueduct Line and place two companies along Le Surmelin Ruisseau facing east. The withdrawal was made in two groups simultaneously about 4:30 p. m. Company H, followed by Company G, moved south along Le Surmelin Ruisseau and took position along the stream in the vicinity of Paroy. Company E retired up the slope east of Moulins and took a position with Companies B and F on the Aqueduct Line and east of Moulins. The detachment of Company C and the Stokes-Mortar Platoon, 30th Infantry, withdrew with Company G, 38th Infantry. [13, 120, 128, 136]

At noon the French 73d Division, which had been assigned to the French XXXVIII Corps, was ordered to counterattack from in rear of the 3d Division in a northeasterly direction across Le Surmelin Ruisseau in order to stop the advance of the enemy. This counterattack was made at 7:30 p. m., but met a German attack and made very little progress. Les Etangs Ferme, however, was retaken by French troops and liaison established with Company M, 38th Infantry. [13, 133, 137, 138, 553]

After the withdrawal of the German 398th Infantry to the railroad at 2 p. m., the German 10th Division engaged in no further offensive operations south of the railway. The 2d Battalion, German 47th Infantry, placed an outpost in the woods north of Crézancy. The 3d Battalion crossed the Marne at 7 p. m. and occupied the village of Mézy during the evening. [107, 114, 116, 118]

About 9 p. m. the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, less Companies A and C, was ordered to take a position on the Woods Line. Company D moved back to the vicinity of Le Souvrien Ferme shortly afterward. Company B remained on the hill west of Moulin Ruiné Signal until the morning of the 16th, when it took up a position on the Woods Line in the vicinity of Connigis. [13, 110, 134, 135]

At 11 p. m. the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, was ordered to move to a position in reserve. In compliance, Companies G and H took a position in the woods southwest of St. Eugène; Company F withdrew from the hill west of Moulin Ruiné Signal at 4:30 a. m., July 16, and Company E fell back at 1 p. m. [13, 108, 109, 136]

At midnight, July 15, the front line of the 38th Infantry was held by the 3d Battalion east of Launay and by Companies B, E and F, on the hill east of Moulins. [95]

The German 36th and 10th Divisions were ordered to make a joint attack at 9:30 p. m. for the purpose of capturing the Surmelin valley, but the order was canceled, and at 6:30 p. m. the 36th Division was instructed to organize for defense, and the 10th Division to withdraw to the north bank of the Marne. The 5th Grenadiers occupied the woods at the mouth of Le Surmelin Ruisseau, northeast of Moulins. [107, 114]•

During the afternoon and evening the 30th and 7th Infantry Regiments endeavored to reoccupy the former front line. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, counterattacked at 3 p. m. from its position in reserve near Grèves Ferme through Bois d'Aigremont toward Fossoy and Mézy. This attack was broken up in Bois d'Aigremont by hostile artillery fire, although two companies reached Fossoy after dark. Patrols from Company M, 7th Infantry, were sent to La Bretonnerie Ferme, Le Rû Chailly Ferme and into the woods east of Fossoy, and found them free of the enemy. [13, 96, 97]

During the afternoon the 30th Infantry ordered Company A of the 38th Infantry, elements of the 3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry, and Companies L and G of the 30th Infantry, in order from right to left, to attack and reoccupy Crézancy, the woods to the northwest and the woods east of Fossoy. Before the advance began, information was received that the attack of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, had failed. Company I, 30th Infantry, was therefore added to the attacking force and ordered to take Fossoy. [13, 117, 139, 140]

This movement started about 8 p. m. with the following results: Company A, 38th Infantry, with two platoons of Company M, 4th Infantry, moved to the woods southwest of

Crézancy, with combat groups on a hill 300 meters north of the position; two platoons of Company L, 30th Infantry, reoccupied the woods northwest of Crézancy, starting at 11 p. m. and getting into position at 1 a. m.; Company G, 30th Infantry, established contact with patrols of the 7th Infantry in the woods east of Fossoy and dug in 50 meters south of the road; Company I, 30th Infantry, arrived in Fossoy where it held two platoons in support of the 7th Infantry. [124, 140, 141, 142]

The 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, 28th Division, was attached to the 30th Infantry and was en route to Bois d'Aigremont at midnight, July 15. [143, 144]

Meanwhile, on the 40-kilometer front of attack in Champagne east of Reims, the enemy met with only slight success, and the line of the French Fourth Army remained intact. On the other hand, on the 40-kilometer front of the French Fifth and Sixth Armies west of Reims, the Germans pushed back the French and Italian divisions for 8 kilometers and were successful except where opposed by the American 3d Division. The enemy ordered a continuation of the attack for July 16, except on the front of the 3d Division. The French Sixth Army ordered a counterattack by five French divisions to be executed on July 16 east of the sector held by the 3d Division. [5, 145, 146]

July 16

At 9:30 a. m., July 16, the French XXXVIII Corps ordered the 3d Division to push its outposts back to the Marne and reoccupy its former positions in front of Fossoy and Crézancy; to block the Surmelin valley, facing to the north, in front of Crézancy and Paroy; and to organize strongly the left bank of Le Surmelin Ruisseau, facing to the east, by pushing outposts as far forward as possible on the right bank of the stream. [147]

In the sector of the 38th Infantry, Companies B, E and F retired from the vicinity of Moulin Ruiné Signal during the day of the 16th, and the entire line of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, became the front. Two companies of the French 346th Infantry located in Bois de la Jute were attached to the 38th Infantry to be used in maintaining liaison with the French to the right. The enemy made no organized attack, although he penetrated to Moulins and the vicinity of Paroy, and stopped in front of the 3d Battalion line. [95, 148, 149, 150]

At 3 a.m. the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, reached Bois d'Aigremont and was ordered by the 30th Infantry to advance from Bois d'Aigremont, relieve elements of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 30th Infantry, and clean up and occupy the ground to the river between the lines running north and south through Crézancy and Fossoy. The advance started about 2 p. m. under heavy artillery fire, with the Crézancy—Fossoy road as a first objective. This was reached and the advance continued into the woods to the north, where Company L, 30th Infantry, was relieved along the northern edge of the woods after midnight, July 16. [13, 151, 152]

During the early morning two platoons of Company A and two platoons of Company E, 7th Infantry, occupied La Bretonnerie Ferme. [13, 125]

The 5th Infantry Brigade ordered the 7th Infantry to push a force into the woods east of Fossoy and ascertain definitely if there were enemy troops still in that vicinity. At 7:30 p. m. one platoon of Company M and three platoons of Company H, 7th Infantry, were ordered to take up a position and hold the high ground in front of Bois d'Aigremont. These platoons moved out from the eastern edge of Fossoy at 9:13 p.m. and by 10 p.m. had taken up a position in the woods formerly held by Company A, 30th Infantry, 1 kilometer northeast of Fossoy. During the night of the 16th and early morning of the 17th, patrols from this detachment established contact with Company A, 7th Infantry, at La Bretonnerie Ferme, and also covered the railroad track as far as Mézy. [13, 125, 153, 154]

During the day, on the front east of Reims, the Germans continued their attempts to break through the French Fourth Army, but without success. West of Reims and east of the 3d Division sector the German advance continued, although slowed up somewhat by the French counterattack. [145, 155]

Preparations for the counteroffensive against the Marne salient continued. In order to enable the French Sixth Army to concentrate on this phase of the battle, the French Ninth Army was ordered to take tactical control of that part of the French Sixth Army on the south bank of the Marne. Its mission was to stop further progress of the German attack and

drive the enemy back across the river. Thus the French Ninth Army would be interposed between the French Fifth and Sixth Armies. However, this arrangement was to be temporary. As soon as the Germans had been forced to withdraw from the south bank of the Marne, and the attack on the salient proper on this front had begun, these troops were to revert to the French Sixth Army. [156]

July 17 The French Ninth Army took command of the French XXXVIII Corps at 8 a. m., July 17. The French 73d Division took command of the sector of the French 125th Division in which it had been operating since the 15th. [157, 158]

In the 3d Division, the only activity on the 17th was in the sector of the 30th Infantry, where the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, having relieved the detachments of the 7th Infantry east of Fossoy, moved forward to the railroad track and sent patrols along the river. This reestablished the former front of the 30th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, reported to the 30th Infantry in Bois d' Aigremont. [13, 159, 160]

Company K, 4th Infantry, and Companies A and C, 38th Infantry, were released from attachment to the 30th Infantry during the day. [161, 162]

Thus ended the 3d Division's participation in the Champagne-Marne Defensive. The great German offensive begun on July 15 was completely spent by the 17th, the day's effort resulting in only small gains southwest of Reims. [3, 163, 164, 165]

On July 17 the Allies and Americans made their final preparations for the counteroffensive to be launched on July 18, which is known as the Aisne-Marne Offensive. The plans, as finally adopted, contemplated that the French Sixth and Tenth Armies would attack the west face of the salient between Château-Thierry and Soissons, thus threatening the German communications. The French Fourth Army, east of Reims, and the French Fifth Army, southwest of the city, were to regain all ground taken by the Germans since July 15. The French Ninth Army was to drive the enemy north of the Marne. The troops under the command of the French Ninth

Army were then to revert to the French Sixth Army, and the French Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Armies were to continue the offensive to reduce the Marne salient. The artillery preparation of the French Fourth Army was to begin at 4 a. m.; that of the French Fifth and Ninth Armies at 5 a. m. [5, 166, 554, 555]

At 4:35 a. m., July 18, the French Sixth and Tenth Armies launched their counteroffensive. The attack took the enemy by surprise, and penetrated his lines between Soissons and Château-Thierry to such an extent that his main artery of communication was seriously endangered. The German High Command at once ordered a retirement to the north bank of the Marne. This retirement was to be effected during the night of July 19-20. [5, 167]

July
18-19

No offensive activity other than artillery fire beginning at 5 a. m. was ordered for the 3d Division on the 18th. The division ordered the Aqueduct and Woods Lines organized for defense. In the sector of the 38th Infantry, the Aqueduct Line was modified by being moved forward to Paroy and Launay, which towns were reoccupied about 9:30 p. m. by Company B. This connected the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, in Crézancy. Companies L and M, 4th Infantry, were transferred from the 30th Infantry to division reserve. The 3d Battalion and Headquarters, 111th Infantry, reported during the day, and completed the relief of the 30th Infantry at 12:30 a. m., July 19. [83, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172]

On the 19th the mission of the division remained unchanged. Its positions were held and active patrolling carried out in front of the line of resistance. During the night of July 19-20 the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, relieved the 111th Infantry, which rejoined its brigade. The divisional zone was now held by the 38th, 7th and 4th Infantry Regiments, from right to left. [1, 97, 173]

The American and Allied attack on the west face of the salient continued with success and the French Ninth Army cautioned its troops to be on the alert for a German withdrawal. [5, 174]

On July 19th the Germans decided to withdraw from the Marne salient. They evacuated the south bank of the Marne

during the night of July 19-20. Four defensive lines were laid out in the salient, which were to mark the successive stages of the movement. South of Soissons, these lines were nearly identical, but between the Ourcq and the Marne and around to Reims, there was to be a progressive withdrawal of the front. [175]

July 20 An attack made early in the morning of July 20 by the French to the east of the 3d Division disclosed the German retirement. At 9 a. m. the division was ordered by telephone to mop up the south bank of the Marne in cooperation with the French 73d Division. The 38th Infantry took up the advance and occupied Varennes and the railroad to the west with elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions in line from right to left. [95, 176]

The attack on the west face of the salient continued on the 20th with favorable results. The French XXXVIII Corps was returned to the French Sixth Army, and at 5 p. m. ordered the 3d Division to send its left regiment, the 4th Infantry, across the Marne, capture Brasles and establish itself in the southwest corner of Bois de Barbillon. The other regiments were to send strong patrols across the river between Chartèves and Gland and establish bridgeheads so that Bois de Barbillon could be attacked from the south and east. [177]

July 21 In accordance with the plan for evacuating the Marne salient, the German units opposite the 3d Division withdrew during the night of July 20-21 to a position, the main line of resistance of which, extended from Chartèves to the ridge north of Mont St. Père, east of La Cense à Dieu, and on to the northwest. The forward limit of the outpost zone was southwest of Mont St. Père, along a line to Breteuil Ferme. [178, 556]

At 9:15 a. m., July 21, the French XXXVIII Corps announced that the enemy was withdrawing in complete disorder and ordered a vigorous pursuit to be started at once. The corps had in line the American 3d Division and the French 39th Division, from right to left. To the right of the 3d Division was the French 73d Division of the French Ninth Army. The 3d Division was to cross the Marne as quickly as possible, invest

Bois de Barbillon from the east, and attack in a northeasterly direction in the following zone of action:

Right boundary: Barzy-sur-Marne (excl.)—west edge of Forêt de Ris (incl.)—Ronchères (incl.).

Left boundary: Brasles (incl.)—la Théoderie (incl.)—la Tieulerie Ferme (incl.)—crossroads 800 meters west of the church in Le Charmel. [179]

Acting on these instructions, the 3d Division issued orders at 2 p. m. for the 38th and 7th Infantry Regiments to assemble in the vicinity of Crézancy and Fossoy, cross the Marne near Mézy and lead the advance with the 38th Infantry on the right. The 4th Infantry was ordered to cross the river at Château-Thierry and then move through Brasles and clean up the southern and eastern edges of Bois de Barbillon, following the 7th Infantry. The 30th Infantry was ordered to cross at Mézy and follow the 38th Infantry. Bridges were to be constructed in the vicinity of Mézy by the 6th Engineers. [180]

Companies B and F, 6th Engineers, were prevented from bridging the Marne at Mézy during daylight of July 21 by machine-gun and artillery fire. About dark Company B moved west to Fossoy and succeeded in erecting a footbridge near that town during the night. Company F succeeded in building a footbridge near Mézy after dark, protected by fire from a mixed detachment of engineers and troops of the 38th Infantry. [13, 181]

These bridging operations were facilitated by the activity farther west where, pursuant to verbal orders, the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, crossed the Marne at Château-Thierry and Chierry at 9:30 a. m. and advanced to Brasles. The 2d and 3d Battalions crossed near Chierry about noon behind the 1st Battalion. Two companies of the 1st Battalion occupied Mont St. Père at 10:30 p. m. and drove enemy machine guns out of the southwestern part of Chartèves. The 2d and 3d Battalions occupied a position in Bois de Barbillon west of Mont St. Père. [13, 182]

Company B, 7th Infantry, crossed the river by boat near Le Rû Chailly Ferme late in the afternoon and took up a covering

position facing Mont St. Père. Companies C and D, 7th Infantry, also crossed here during the night, while Company A crossed near Mézy under machine-gun fire. These units were not in the front line. [13, 97]

The 38th Infantry assembled in the vicinity of Mézy after dark and remained there until early the next morning waiting for the bridge to be completed. [13, 95]

To the east of the 3d Division, the French 73d Division was also preparing to cross the river. To the west, the French 39th Division had attacked in the morning, advanced through Bois de Barbillon, and captured La Cense à Dieu. Later in the day the enemy drove the French out of La Cense à Dieu. [183, 184]

The front of the 3d Division south of the Marne was held during the night of July 21-22 by the 38th Infantry. North of the Marne, it was held by the 4th Infantry. [13]

In its instructions for the following day the French XXXVIII Corps made no change in the mission already assigned. The zone of action of the 3d Division was changed to the following:

Right boundary: Jaulgonne (incl.)—le Charmel Château (incl.)—a point 500 meters east of Villardelle Ferme—east edge of Ronchères—east edge of Cierges.

Left boundary: La Tieulerie Ferme (incl.)—southeast edge of La Vente Jean Guillaume wood—east edge of Courmont—west edge of Cierges.

Because of the narrow front, the 3d Division was to advance with only one regiment in the front line. The right flank was to be prepared to meet an attack from Forêt de Ris. [185]

July 22 The 3d Division continued its operations on July 22 under the plan issued on the previous day. The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, crossed the Marne at Mézy at 4 a. m. and advanced up the hill northeast of Chartèves toward Les Franquets Ferme. The 1st Battalion crossed the river at Mézy about 6 a. m. and advanced along the river road and hillside toward Jaulgonne. The 2d Battalion crossed at 8:30 a. m. and followed the 1st Battalion. The latter captured the town of Jaulgonne during the morning, and shortly after noon started to march in advance-guard formation toward Le Charmel. The battalion penetrated the German position as far as the northern part of Le Charmel,

the advance guard arriving in the village about 1:15 p. m. Being unsupported on both flanks, the battalion fell back by successive withdrawals to Jaulgonne. It took up a position about 5 p. m. in the northern edge of the village and on the hill to the northwest, where contact was established with the 3d Battalion. [13, 95, 186, 187]

The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, cleaned up the ridge northeast of Chartèves, as far as the woods south and southwest of Les Franquets Ferme. The battalion was unsupported on the left and moved that flank back to the clearing in the woods about 2 kilometers northeast of Chartèves. [13, 95]

The 2d Battalion advanced from Mézy toward Jaulgonne and then into the woods west of that town, in support of the other two battalions. Elements of the battalion entered the front line. [13, 95]

In the 4th Infantry, the 1st Battalion moved northeast from Mont St. Père, captured Moulin Doly, and was stopped about 500 meters north of that point, where it dug in. The 2d Battalion, in support, moved out during the afternoon and became engaged west of Moulin Doly. The battalion bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of crossroads 197. The 3d Battalion remained in Mont St. Père. [13, 182]

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved from Mont St. Père during the afternoon and passed through the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, north of Moulin Doly. The head of the column was stopped about 600 meters south of La Tieulerie Ferme. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, crossed the Marne during the morning and followed in support of the 1st Battalion. Wheeling to the northwest, it captured La Théoderie. These two battalions were in the front line. The 3d Battalion crossed the Marne and remained in Mont St. Père. [13, 97]

The formation of the division at this time was as follows:

5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE		6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE	
7th Infantry		38th Infantry	
2d Battalion	1st Battalion	3d Battalion	1st Battalion
			2d Battalion

4th Infantry
 2d Battalion 1st Battalion
 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry
 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry
 DIVISION RESERVE
 30th Infantry
[13]

To the right of the 3d Division, the French 73d Division crossed the Marne and captured Rozay and Hill 226. There was no front-line contact with the 3d Division. To the left, the French 39th Division advanced its right flank to the northern edge of Bois du Chanois, where it was in contact with the 7th Infantry. [188, 189, 190, 191]

The French XXXVIII Corps ordered the attack continued on July 23 at 3:55 a. m. The enemy front was to be broken by the exploitation of local attacks. Points chosen for attack were to receive a 10-minute artillery preparation just prior to H-hour. [192]

In compliance with the corps orders, the 3d Division ordered the 5th Infantry Brigade to advance on the road, Mont St. Père—point 210—point 224—le Charmel, with the 4th Infantry leading. The 7th Infantry was to act as left-flank guard. The 6th Infantry Brigade, less the 30th Infantry, was to remain in place until the 5th Infantry Brigade was slightly ahead of it, when it was to advance on the Jaulgonne—le Charmel road, providing its own flank protection. The 30th Infantry, as division reserve, was to continue to move toward Mézy, and be prepared to cross the Marne. [193]

July 23 The 6th Infantry Brigade made no advance on July 23, the line of the 38th Infantry remaining the same as on the preceding night. [95]

In the 5th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, advanced from its position south of La Tieulerie Ferme during the early morning through Bois de Mont l'Evêque and reached the edge of the woods south and west of the farm buildings. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion, advanced northwest through Bois de Mont l'Evêque

to the vicinity of Grange Marie Ferme, later falling back to the southern edge of Bois de Mont l'Evêque. The relief of the 1st Battalion was accomplished later during the night. [13, 97, 194]

The 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, advanced at 4 a. m. from the vicinity of Moulin Doly toward Les Franquets Ferme, but was stopped by machine-gun fire from that point and the woods to the west. The battalion withdrew a short distance into the woods and entrenched. The 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, was ordered to proceed northeast from crossroads 197 and extend the left of the 1st Battalion. This battalion was held up by fire from La Tieulerie Ferme, which was finally captured by Company H. The remainder of the battalion dug in across the valley to the south of the farm. [13, 182]

The formation of the battalions of the 5th Infantry Brigade at this time was as follows:

5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

1st Bn, 7th Inf	2d Bn, 4th Inf	1st Bn, 4th Inf
3d Bn, 7th Inf	3d Bn, 4th Inf	
2d Bn, 7th Inf		

[13]

To the right, the French 73d Division had occupied Barzy-sur-Marne, where the 3d Division established liaison by a mixed post. To the left, the French 39th Division had advanced to the south of Grange Marie Ferme. [195, 196, 197]

The French XXXVIII Corps ordered an attack for 4:05 a. m., July 24, preceded by a 10-minute artillery preparation. The 3d Division was assigned the line, Le Charmel Château—le Charmel, as its objective. Based on these instructions, the attack order of the 3d Division, issued at 11 a. m., directed the 5th Infantry Brigade to advance in liaison with the French and occupy the position north of Les Franquets Ferme. There was to be no advance by the 6th Infantry Brigade. The 30th Infantry was to relieve the 38th Infantry, and protect the right flank. The advancing troops were to halt at noon and entrench, unless there were indications of a rapid enemy retirement. [198, 199]

July 24

During the night of July 23-24, in accordance with their plans for the evacuation of the Marne salient, the Germans opposing the French XXXVIII Corps withdrew to a line, Vincelles—l'Hérolle—le Charmel—Beuvarde. [200]

In the 5th Infantry Brigade, the 4th Infantry attacked at 8 a. m. along the western slope of the ridge toward Le Charmel with the 3d, 2d and 1st Battalions in column in that order. The leading battalion dug in along the northern edge of wood No. 10 (part of Bois du Charmel), about 1,200 meters southwest of Le Charmel. [13, 182]

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, advanced on the left of the 4th Infantry at 9 a. m. and took up a position in Forêt de Fère northeast of La Tieulerie Ferme, but not in the front line. [13, 97, 194]

In the 6th Infantry Brigade, the 30th Infantry had relieved the 38th Infantry during the night of July 23-24. The 2d Battalion, plus Companies A and B, took over the lines in and around Jaulgonne. The 3d Battalion, plus Companies C and D, took over the lines on the ridge south and southwest of Les Franquets Ferme. [95, 96]

The 30th Infantry received orders at 7:30 a. m. to advance at 9 a. m. The 2d Battalion, with attached companies, moved forward at 11:30 a. m. on both sides of the Jaulgonne—le Charmel road, cleaning up machine-gun resistance. About 2 p. m. a mixed detachment crossed Ruisseau de la Belle Aulne. Being unsupported, it fell back about 6 p. m. and established a line east and north of Argentol. Parts of Companies A and B, attached to the 2d Battalion, advanced to the west of the Jaulgonne—le Charmel road and reached the northern edge of Bois du Charmel. Later in the afternoon these companies took up a position near the northern edge of the wood where they remained until the morning of July 25, when they rejoined the 2d Battalion near Argentol. [13, 557, 558, 559]

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, advanced from the woods southwest of Les Franquets Ferme along the ridge toward Le Charmel. Overcoming machine-gun resistance, the battalion reached the buildings in the southwestern edge of Le Charmel

and wood No. 10 where a front-line position was organized during the afternoon. [13, 361]

To the east, the French 4th Division, which was relieving the French 73d Division, entered Forêt de Ris. There was no front-line contact with the 3d Division. To the west, the French 39th Division reached the eastern edge of Forêt de Fère where it was in contact with the 3d Division. [386, 444]

The French XXXVIII Corps, believing that the enemy was making a hurried retreat, ordered the pursuit to be pushed. Cavalry was to be ready to pass through the infantry at day-break, July 25. [201]

The 3d Division ordered the advance to be continued at 4 a. m. by all elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade. The 30th Infantry was to be relieved by a passage of lines. The 5th Infantry Brigade issued orders at 2:30 a. m., July 25, for an advance in two columns, the 7th Infantry on the right and the 4th Infantry on the left. [194, 202, 203]

The 7th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion leading, advanced east at 7:30 a. m., July 25, with the object of passing through the lines of the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, and continuing the attack in the right portion of the divisional zone. The leading battalion came under heavy artillery fire in the vicinity of Argentol and developed strong resistance in the woods to the east of that place. The battalion took up the position formerly held by the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, which had been withdrawn during the night. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Infantry, came under shellfire in Bois du Charmel, and halted. [13, 97, 204, 205, 206, 558]

The 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, advanced at 6 a. m. and by evening had taken and occupied Le Charmel. During the evening the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, was moved into the village to help hold it against counterattack. [13, 182, 194, 208]

To the right, where the French Fifth Army had relieved the French Ninth Army, the French 4th Division advanced to the ravine of Ruisseau de la Belle Aulne in Forêt de Ris without contact with the 3d Division. To the left, the French 39th Division reached the highway separating Forêt de Fère and

July 25

La Vente Jean Guillaume wood, where contact was established with the 3d Division. [209, 210, 211]

July 26

The French XXXVIII Corps ordered an attack at 10 a. m., July 26, to be made by one regiment of the French 39th Division and two battalions of the 3d Division, with the capture of La Vente Jean Guillaume wood and the ridge north of La Fosse Ferme as objectives. This advance was to be supported on the left by the American 42d Division of the American I Corps. [207, 212, 213]

The attack started at 4:50 p. m. The 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, were the assault elements in the zone of the 3d Division. The French 39th Division could not advance. The two battalions of the 3d Division reached Le Charmel, but could not advance beyond the village. They were withdrawn from Le Charmel after dark. Liaison with the French 4th Division, which also failed to advance, was established east of Argentol. [13, 97, 182, 194, 214, 215]

The French Sixth Army planned to cross the Ourcq River, 5 kilometers northeast of Le Charmel, in an attack to start at 9:40 p. m., July 27. In the French XXXVIII Corps, the attack was to be made by the American 55th Infantry Brigade, 28th Division, which was to advance in two columns through the American 3d and French 39th Divisions at 9:40 p. m. It was to cover the entire corps front. The mission of the 3d Division in the attack was to protect the right flank of the corps by occupying with two battalions of the 5th Infantry Brigade the two northern corners of Forêt de Ris and the village of Ronchères. [216, 217]

July 27

During the night of July 26-27 the enemy withdrew to the Ourcq. Rear guards well supplied with machine guns covered the withdrawal. The German retirement opposite the French XXXVIII Corps was first observed about 8 a. m. The French 39th Division took up the pursuit promptly, reaching Courmont at 4 p. m. [218, 219, 220]

Meanwhile, at 11:15 a. m. the French XXXVIII Corps issued telephonic instructions to the 3d Division to advance immediately to the northern edge of Forêt de Ris, to Rochères and to

the southwestern edge of Bois Meunière. At 1 p. m. division orders were issued. [221, 222, 223]

The 5th Infantry Brigade advanced shortly thereafter with the 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, leading. Machine-gun resistance at Le Charmel Château was eliminated by patrols from the 2d and 3d Battalions, and the 3d Battalion continued on to Villardelle Ferme. At 8:30 p. m. instructions were issued by the division to organize a line from the northwestern corner of Forêt de Ris to Cote 190, southeast of Courmont. Accordingly, the 5th Infantry Brigade advanced the 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, to the line from Villardelle Ferme to Cote 190, and ordered the 7th Infantry to hold a line from Villardelle Ferme to Ruisseau de la Belle Aulne. This latter was not a front-line position. Contact was established to both flanks. [13, 182, 194, 219, 224, 225]

Because of the changed situation, the attack planned for the night of July 27 by the French Sixth Army was canceled and the American 28th Division was ordered to relieve the French 39th Division. While this relief was in progress, the French XXXVIII Corps ordered the 28th Division to carry out the original plan and attack at 11 p. m., July 27. The relief was not accomplished in time to make this attack. [217, 226, 227]

Additional instructions from the corps directed the advance guards to maintain close contact with the enemy. If he did not make a stand on the line of the Ourcq, they were to push on to the Vesle River, about 19 kilometers north of Courmont. [228, 229]

At 5:45 a. m., July 28, the 3d Division ordered the 5th Infantry Brigade to advance at once along the Ronchères—Cierges road with the mission of reaching the Vesle River during the day. [230]

July 28

With the 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, leading, the 5th Infantry Brigade crossed the Ourcq and, about 3 p. m., captured Ronchères. This attack was assisted on the right by the French 4th Division, which was in close liaison with the Americans. To the left, the American 28th Division reached the Ourcq River during the morning. [13, 182, 194, 231, 232, 233]

Pursuant to orders from the French XXXVIII Corps, the

3d Division, at 2:30 p. m., ordered the 5th Infantry Brigade to continue its attack, with Bois des Grimpettes and the high ground east of Cierges as objectives. The advance was to be made in conjunction with flank divisions. This order was transmitted to the 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, which pushed on for several hundred meters north of Ronchères, where it was held up by machine-gun and artillery fire. Contact was established with the French 4th Division by patrols, but there was no front-line contact with the American 28th Division. [13, 231, 234, 235, 236]

The French XXXVIII Corps directed the 3d Division to continue the attack at 3:40 a. m., July 29, without change in objectives. Orders of the 3d Division made no change in distribution of troops and set no time for the resumption of the advance. [237, 238]

July 29 The 4th Infantry attacked at 6:50 a. m., with the 2d Battalion leading, supported by the 1st Battalion. The advance reached the northern edge of Hill 226 and Les 18 Arpents ravine, where it was stopped by fire from Bois Meunière and Bois des Grimpettes. The attack was made in conjunction with flank divisions, which also made but slight gains. Contact was established with the French, but there was no front-line liaison with the 28th Division, which had advanced to the southwestern slope of Cote 188. [13, 182, 194, 239, 240, 241]

July 30 The 3d Division, less artillery, was relieved by the American 32d Division during the night of July 29-30, the relief of the front-line elements of the 4th Infantry being completed after midnight. Command of the zone of advance passed to the 32d Division at 11 a. m., July 30. The 3d Division, less artillery, assembled in the vicinity of Château-Thierry, south of the Marne, in reserve of the French XXXVIII Corps. The 3d Field Artillery Brigade supported the 32d Division until August 2. The 3d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, remained in support of the 32d Division until August 12. [1, 182, 242, 243, 244, 245]

*July 31-
Aug. 2* The evacuation of the Marne salient by the Germans continued according to schedule, the final phase of the retreat being a withdrawal to the north banks of the Aisne and Vesle

Rivers. This movement was executed in two stages, the first on the night of August 1-2, when a small bridgehead was occupied south of the Vesle, and the second on the night of August 2-3, when the main body crossed the Vesle. Strong outposts established south of the river were to fight for the possession of the Vesle valley, and the north bank was to be held at all costs. Any Allied troops who crossed the river were to be counterattacked promptly and driven back to the south bank. [246, 247, 248, 249]

Upon discovering the German withdrawal, the French ordered a vigorous pursuit by advance guards composed of all arms. The main body of the troops, however, was not to become engaged unless serious resistance was encountered, and was not to cross the Vesle River until the advance guards were firmly established on the north bank. [250]

The 6th Infantry Brigade was detached from the 3d Division on August 2, and ordered to join the French III Corps, which was advancing from the Ourcq to the Vesle River to the right of the French XXXVIII Corps. [251, 252]

The brigade moved by truck during the night of August 2-3 to the west of Goussancourt, 13 kilometers south of St. Gilles, and reported to the French III Corps, which directed it to move to the vicinity of St. Gilles. The brigade order issued at 4:50 p. m. designated the 38th Infantry to lead the march. Movement was started at 6:30 p. m. [13, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257]

Aug. 3

Acting on information that its advance guards had crossed the Ardre River at Courville and St. Gilles and were in contact with the enemy on the line, La Cense Ferme—Hill 179—Chezelles Ferme (about 750 meters southwest of Fismes), the French III Corps issued orders at 8 p. m. for the 6th Infantry Brigade to form the main body of the left column of the corps and follow the advance guards. The latter were to push on across the Vesle during the night. If this could not be accomplished, there was to be a general attack for the purpose of forcing a crossing to commence at 3:30 a. m., August 4. The boundary between the two columns was to be: east edge of small woods 1 kilometer east of St. Gilles—Hill 179—Villette, all to the 6th Infantry Brigade. [257, 258, 259]

These instructions were passed on to the troops by the 6th Infantry Brigade at 1:30 a. m., August 4, while en route to St. Gilles. The 38th Infantry, in the lead, was not to pass beyond St. Gilles without liaison to both flanks. [256]

Aug. 4

The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, arrived at Mont-sur-Courville at midnight, August 3. An officer patrol sent to St. Gilles came under enemy machine-gun fire from across the Ardre. The patrol rejoined the battalion in Mont-sur-Courville at 4:30 a. m. The 2d and 1st Battalions, 38th Infantry, marched to Mont-sur-Courville and then back to Arcis-le-Ponsart, about 3 kilometers to the southeast, arriving at 4:50 a. m., August 4. [13, 260]

The orders of the French III Corps did not direct the 6th Infantry Brigade to relieve any specific organization. At 8 a. m. the corps took command of the sector held by the French XXXVIII Corps including the 3d, 32d and 28th Divisions. At 11:20 a. m. the French III Corps directed that one regiment of the 6th Infantry Brigade be pushed forward to relieve the 18th Battalion of Chasseurs. The 38th Infantry was detailed for this duty in a brigade order issued at 11:45 a. m. The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, marched from Mont-sur-Courville at 10 p. m. It effected the relief at 2 a. m., August 5, at Les Petites Chezelles Ferme, 2 kilometers southwest of St. Gilles, in a support position. [13, 256, 257, 261, 262, 504]

At 6 p. m., August 4, the enemy rear guards were resisting at La Cense Ferme, Hill 179 and Chezelles Ferme. The French 147th Infantry had captured the small wood south of the target range (Tir), 1 kilometer south of Fismes, and the American 32d Division had entered Fismes from the west. [263]

At 8 p. m. orders were issued by the French III Corps to continue the pursuit beyond the Vesle, and for one regiment of the 6th Infantry Brigade to relieve the French 147th Infantry and form the advance guard of the left column. [257, 292]

The 6th Infantry Brigade issued orders at 11 p. m. for the 38th Infantry to make the relief after proper reconnaissance. This order was received by the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, at Arcis-le-Ponsart, at 2:30 a. m., August 5. [13, 264, 265]

At 8 a. m., August 5, the American III Corps took command

of the zone of the French III Corps and announced that orders and instructions already issued by the French were to remain in force. Pursuit beyond the Vesle was to be continued. [266, 267, 275]

Aug. 5

Pursuant to verbal instructions from the corps, the 6th Infantry Brigade issued orders at 6:45 p. m. for the 38th Infantry to take up the advance and reconnoiter beyond the Vesle. Before receiving the above order, the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, had marched from Arcis-le-Ponsart at 7:10 p. m. to relieve the 147th Infantry. The latter had been advancing during the day to the Vesle valley, west of Villette. [257, 265, 268, 269, 270]

The 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, completed the relief of the French 147th Infantry south of the Vesle River and west of Villette, at 6:35 a. m., August 6, in the following zone of action:

Aug. 6

Right boundary: Hill 179 (incl.)—Villette (incl.)

Left boundary: Fismes (excl.)—point 80 (incl.).

The brigade front was occupied by Companies C and B from right to left. Company C first deployed along the railroad, but late in the afternoon moved to the west and took up a position in the vicinity of the trail connecting the railroad and Route Nationale No. 31. Company B was along the railroad. Liaison was established with the French 4th Division to the right and the American 32d Division to the left. [13, 259, 269, 270, 272, 292]

The battalion remained in this position throughout the day, having received no orders to attack across the Vesle. Company C was ordered to send patrols across the river if the French to their right did so. The brigade order of August 5 to reconnoiter the north bank of the Vesle reached the battalion at 6:50 p. m., August 6. The battalion reported that patrols would be sent across during the night. [13, 270, 272]

The Aisne-Marne Offensive closed on August 6. French General Headquarters directed that the French Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Armies would take no action in force north of the Vesle River. They were, however, to continue operations to establish bridgeheads north of the Vesle for the purpose of securing a line of departure for a new offensive and to engage

the enemy on this front while the British launched the Somme Offensive to the northwest on August 8. [5, 163, 273]

Pursuant to orders from the French Sixth Army, which were based on the supposition that the enemy was retreating, the American III Corps issued orders for an advance on August 7 in three columns; the French 4th Division on the right, the American 6th Infantry Brigade in the center, and the American 28th Division, which had relieved the American 32d Division, on the left. The 1st Battalion, 107th Engineers, 32d Division, was attached to the 6th Infantry Brigade for the advance. The right column was not to advance until the other two columns had established themselves on the north bank. The objective was the plateau 4 kilometers north of the river. [274]

The activities of the 6th Infantry Brigade during the period August 7-11 are known as the Vesle Sector operation. [163]

Aug. 7 At 4 a. m., August 7, the 6th Infantry Brigade ordered the advance guard of its column to be composed of two battalions, 38th Infantry; two companies, 6th Engineers; and two companies, 9th Machine-Gun Battalion. Starting from the railroad they were to cross the river in small columns and advance up Ruisseau Ste. Marie. The main body, consisting of the remainder of the brigade, was not to move forward until the advance guard had established itself on the line of heights north of the river. The engineers were to construct five footbridges over the Vesle in the vicinity of its junction with Ruisseau Ste. Marie. The advance was to be supported by a rolling barrage. [276]

Company C, 6th Engineers, built a floating bridge in front of the left flank of Company B, 38th Infantry, during the night of August 6-7, and in the afternoon of August 7 built a plank footbridge under machine-gun fire on the site of the destroyed bridge on the right flank, in front of Company C, 38th Infantry. Company D, 38th Infantry, covered the latter operation. [13, 277]

Owing to changes and misunderstandings as to H-hour, the attack of the columns was not coordinated. In the zone of advance of the 6th Infantry Brigade, the attack started about 3:40 p. m. Messages to the troops changing the hour of attack

were received later. Elements of Company C, on the right, succeeded in crossing the river and advancing a short distance. Company B, on the left, was held up at the river and only a few men got across. [13, 257, 269, 278]

The 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, located about 1 kilometer south of St. Gilles, received the attack order at 2:30 p. m., and shortly thereafter took up the march toward Fismes. On leaving the eastern outskirts of Fismes, the battalion came under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, and took cover along the railroad track. [13, 279]

About 5:30 p. m. the enemy crossed the river in front of the French near Le Roland Usine and attacked across the railroad track to Route Nationale No. 31. After a short fight they were forced to retreat to the north bank. [13, 280]

After dark the troops of the 1st Battalion across the Vesle were ordered to retire to their former position along the railroad, and the 2d Battalion was ordered to move back to its position in the vicinity of St. Gilles. These movements were carried out during the night. [13, 281]

On August 8, the III Corps directed that the south bank of the Vesle would be organized for defense. The relief of the 6th Infantry Brigade by the French 164th Division on August 10 was also ordered. The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion in the front line during the night of August 8-9. [13, 282, 283, 284]

Aug.
8-11

At 9 a. m., August 9, the corps ordered small bridgeheads established north of the Vesle by local operations. The 6th Infantry Brigade was attached to the French 164th Division, and was to accomplish the task on the 9th, although this necessitated a delay of 24 hours in the relief of the brigade as previously ordered. [285, 286]

In an order issued at 7:20 p. m., the French 164th Division set the time for the attack as 4 a. m., August 10. The advance was to be preceded by a 30-minute artillery preparation. The 6th Infantry Brigade ordered the advance to be made by two companies of the 30th Infantry, supported by the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry. The objective was the head of the ravine about 3 kilometers northeast of Fismes. [13, 287, 288]

Companies G and H, 30th Infantry, detailed to lead the attack, were late in leaving Les Petites Chezelles Ferme on the 10th and were caught in the German counterbarrage. The river was reached and a few men crossed after daylight but, in general, the attack was unsuccessful. [13, 256]

The 6th Infantry Brigade was relieved by units of the French 164th Division during the night of August 10-11, command passing at 8 a. m., August 11. The brigade then rejoined the 3d Division in the vicinity of Château-Thierry, and the 1st Battalion, 107th Engineers, rejoined the 32d Division. From Château-Thierry, the division moved by stages to the St. Mihiel region as part of the concentration of the American First Army for the St. Mihiel Offensive. [1, 257, 289, 290, 291]

**CASUALTIES, AISNE DEFENSIVE, CHÂTEAU-THIERRY SECTOR,
CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE, AISNE-MARNE
OFFENSIVE AND VESLE SECTOR**

	May 31- June 5	June 6-14	July 15-17	July 18-23	July 24-26	July 27-30	July 31- Aug. 5	Aug. 6-13	Total
<i>3d Division</i>									
4th Inf.....	W.....	71	175	234	346	141	6	16	989
	DW.....	8	11	7	16	9	---	---	51
	K.....	16	27	45	37	20	2	---	147
7th Inf..... (DS June 15-24)	W.....	6	34	538	120	203	48	2	953
	DW.....	---	2	20	4	10	5	---	41
	K.....	---	3	172	23	25	6	2	231
30th Inf.....	W.....	6	93	490	60	342	19	5	1,157
	DW.....	---	10	18	2	8	1	---	28
	K.....	---	17	151	6	54	3	6	237
38th Inf.....	W.....	6	45	425	331	84	13	8	1,242
	DW.....	---	2	1	23	9	2	---	12
	K.....	2	18	184	65	7	1	---	74
10th FA (July 11- Aug. 13) (DS July 30-Aug. 2)	W.....	---	16	179	32	11	6	---	245
	DW.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	K.....	---	1	23	3	1	---	---	29
18th FA (July 13- Aug. 13) (DS July 30-Aug. 2) ¹	W.....	---	6	68	83	18	4	1	190
	DW.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	K.....	---	1	8	3	3	---	---	16
76th FA (July 5- Aug. 13) (DS July 30-Aug. 2) ¹	W.....	---	3	5	4	3	---	---	18
	DW.....	---	3	44	12	1	44	---	104
	K.....	---	---	1	---	---	---	---	5
7th MG Bn.....	W.....	23	8	9	1	1	---	---	42
	DW.....	3	2	2	---	---	1	---	8
	K.....	6	2	1	---	---	---	---	9
8th MG Bn.....	W.....	---	6	58	17	21	5	---	107
	DW.....	---	---	4	---	---	---	---	4
	K.....	---	---	17	---	1	---	---	18
9th MG Bn.....	W.....	5	9	52	54	28	1	25	174
	DW.....	---	1	1	2	---	---	---	4
	K.....	2	2	15	8	4	---	---	31
6th Engrs..... (June 13-Aug. 13)	W.....	---	26	259	37	6	7	4	357
	DW.....	---	1	9	2	---	---	---	14
	K.....	---	2	39	5	---	---	---	51
Others.....	W.....	3	20	90	24	19	14	5	177
	DW.....	1	4	5	4	1	2	1	18
	K.....	---	1	18	2	1	2	3	27
Total.....	65	432	3,151	1,199	1,254	360	37	679	7,177
<i>Attached Units</i>									
111th Inf (28th Div.) (July 16-19)	W.....	---	47	35	---	---	---	---	82
	DW.....	---	1	---	---	---	---	---	1
	K.....	---	4	5	---	---	---	---	9
1st Bn, 107th Engrs (32d Div.) (Aug. 7-11)	W.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	2
	DW.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	K.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Total.....	---	---	52	40	---	---	---	2	94
Aggregate total.....	65	432	3,203	1,239	1,254	360	37	681	7,271

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action; DS=detached service.

¹ 3d Bn, DS, July 30-Aug. 12.

St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives and Subsequent Service

CORPS RESERVE, ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE,
SEPTEMBER 12-15

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 26-
NOVEMBER 1

SUBSEQUENT SERVICE, NOVEMBER 2, 1918-
AUGUST 1919

FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived in France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army under American command at the earliest possible moment. To accomplish this would normally consume considerable time because it would first be necessary to transport a large number of troops to Europe, provide for their supply and complete their training. The organization of this army was further deferred by the critical situation created by the German offensives launched in the spring and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the Allied reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they received immediate support. In this crisis the American Commander-in-Chief postponed for the time being the concentration of American divisions for the formation of an American army, and made all American combatant forces available for service with the British and French armies. With this assistance, the Allies were able not only to stop the German offensives before they gained a decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch the Aisne-Marne Offensive against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a mission for an American army. The immediate purpose of this plan was to reduce the salients which interfered with railroad communications which were essential to further offensive operations. One of these was the St. Mihiel salient. [3, 16]

The American First Army was organized on August 10, and directed to reduce this salient. On August 30 it assumed command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun. [16]

It was originally planned that the attack on the St. Mihiel salient would be exploited to the fullest extent. On September 2, however, it was decided that the First Army would launch the Meuse-Argonne Offensive later in the month. The St. Mihiel Offensive, therefore, was limited to clearing the salient only so far as was necessary to insure the safety of the later operation. The army plan, as finally approved, provided for a main attack on the south face of the salient by the American I and IV Corps from right to left, on a front of approximately 23 kilometers; a secondary attack against the west face by the V Corps; and a holding attack against the tip of the salient by the French II Colonial Corps. The operation was to begin at 1 a. m., September 12, with an artillery preparation. The main attack was to be launched at 5 a. m.; the secondary attack at 8 a. m. The attack was launched on the morning of September 12 as planned and was immediately successful. On the following day the salient was closed. From this time until the close of the operation on September 16, the First Army consolidated its lines on this front while it began concentrating the bulk of its forces west of the Meuse River for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. [16]

With the reduction of the St. Mihiel and other salients the immediate purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had been accomplished, and it became possible to undertake the great converging offensives which had been agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in September. These offensives included an American attack to be launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the Argonne and the Suippes River; a renewal of the Somme Offensive on September 27; and a combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken. [6, 16, 293, 294]

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army was to be directed against the principal German lateral line of supply, the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad, which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers from the front. The severing of this artery would render the German positions to the west and north-west of Sedan untenable. [16]

Protecting this vital supply line, the Germans had, during the previous four years, constructed a strong system of field fortifications. On the Meuse-Argonne front, there were four distinct defensive positions. The first lay close behind the front line. The second included Montfaucon and traversed the Argonne south of Apremont. The third, which was known to the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of their great defensive system, popularly called the Hindenburg Line, which ran from the vicinity of Metz to the North Sea. This position extended from Bois de Forêt, across the heights of Cunel and Romagne, to include the high ground north of Grandpré. The fourth position included the heights of Barri-court, and extended westward to Buzancy and Thénorgues. The first three positions had been thoroughly organized, and numerous intermediate positions constructed between them. These defenses, together with the natural military strength of the terrain, presented a formidable obstacle to an attacking army. The importance of the communications protected by this front made it certain that the Germans would resist here to the last extremity. [16]

The plan of the First Army contemplated an initial advance of 16 kilometers and a penetration of the hostile third position. This penetration would force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest, and insure the junction of the First Army with the French Fourth Army at Grandpré. A further advance of 16 kilometers was then to be made to the line, Stenay—le Chesne. Such an advance would outflank the enemy's position along the Aisne River, in front of the French Fourth Army, and clear the way for an advance on Mézières or Sedan. These operations were to be supplemented by an attack to clear the heights east of the Meuse River as far as Bois de la Grande Montagne. [16]

In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the front of the First Army was extended from Watronville to the west edge of the Argonne Forest on September 22. It attacked at 5:30 a. m., September 26, with the III, V and I Corps in line from right to left. West of the Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army attacked in conjunction with the American forces. Elements of the First Army east of the Meuse did not attack during the opening days of the offensive. [16]

By September 30 the First Army had penetrated the hostile second position and reached the general line, Bois de la Côte Lémont—Nantillois—Apremont. [3, 16]



The following paragraphs, in *italic*, are a synopsis of the service of the 3d Division in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

When the St. Mihiel Offensive opened on September 12, the 3d Division was in reserve of the IV Corps, First Army. On September 15, when the success of the operation was assured, the division moved to the Meuse-Argonne region.

It was in reserve of the III Corps when the Meuse-Argonne Offensive began on September 26. On the 29th it was transferred to the V Corps for the purpose of relieving the 79th Division in the vicinity of Nantillois. The relief was completed during the evening of September 30.

The division attacked on October 4 and advanced about 1,500 meters. The right of the division moved forward almost 1 kilometer on October 5, but the left made only slight gains. Attacks between October 5 and October 8 failed to make any substantial progress, but on October 9 the front line was advanced another 1,500 meters to the northern edge of Bois de Cunel.

On October 10 the attack by the division, as a part of a general attack by the V Corps, was unsuccessful. On the following day, however, the right of the division advanced to positions about 400 meters south of Cunel. The left was still unable to advance.

The 3d Division passed to the III Corps on October 12. On October 12 and 13 it relieved the forward elements of the 4th and 5th Divisions in Bois de Forêt and east and south of Cunel.

On October 14 the division attacked in the direction of Cléry-le-Grand. The 5th Division passed through the 3d Division on the morning of the 14th and attacked in the old zone of action of the 3d Division. The left of the 3d Division reached the northern edge of Bois de la Pultière on this date. There was a further gain of about 500 meters on the 15th. The troops in Bois de la Pultière were relieved by the 5th Division on the 17th and 18th. On October 18 the 3d Division took over the zone of the 4th Division to its right. Clairs Chênes wood was captured on October 20. On the 21st Hill 297 and Côte 299 were occupied. Bois de Forêt was completely occupied on the 22d. On October 23 the line was advanced to positions about 1 kilometer southwest of Cléry-le-Grand, where it remained until October 26.

The 3d Division was relieved by the 5th Division during the night of October 26-27.

Sept.
12-15

After serving in the Allied and American operations in the Aisne-Marne region in June, July and early August, the 3d Division was concentrated in the vicinity of Château-Thierry. From there it moved by way of the 1st (Gondrecourt) and 5th (Vaucouleurs) Training Areas to the St. Mihiel region as part of the concentration of the First Army for the St. Mihiel Offensive. When this operation began on September 12, the division was in the vicinity of Beaumont, 18 kilometers east of St. Mihiel, as reserve of the IV Corps. Elements of the division were detached for service with the 1st and 42d Divisions and with the IV Corps. On September 12, as part of the general attack of the First Army, the IV Corps advanced against the south face of the salient with the 89th, 42d and 1st Divisions in line from right to left. The attack of the First Army was immediately successful and by the evening of the first day it had gained the first objectives for the second day on most of its front. Reports from aviators and ground troops indicated that the enemy was withdrawing from the salient. The army

commander, therefore, directed the IV and V Corps to push strong detachments forward to Vigneulles during the night of September 12-13. Pursuant to these instructions, detachments of the 1st Division, IV Corps, and of the 26th Division, V Corps, effected a junction in the vicinity of Vigneulles early on the morning of September 13, thus closing the salient. During the 13th, elements of the 3d Division moved forward and assumed positions of readiness in close support of the 1st and 42d Divisions. [1, 16]

On September 13, the army objective was reached on the entire front of the First Army, and strong reconnaissance detachments pushed beyond it. Organization of the new position was begun at once preparatory to withdrawing divisions and corps troops for participation in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. [16]

All detached units reverted to the control of the 3d Division on September 15 and the division moved to the vicinity of Nixéville, 9 kilometers southwest of Verdun. [1]

The division remained in the vicinity of Nixéville until the night of September 25-26, when it moved to positions in Forêt de Hesse, 10 kilometers south of Montfaucon, where it passed to reserve of the III Corps. [1]

It remained in reserve of the III Corps until September 29 when it was transferred to the V Corps. The V Corps directed the 3d Division to relieve the 79th Division during the night of September 29-30. The 3d Division, at midnight, September 29, directed that the relief would be accomplished by the 5th Infantry Brigade. [295, 296, 297, 298]

The zone to be taken over was that of the right division of the V Corps. The 4th Division, III Corps, was to the right and the 32d Division to the left. The 32d Division was relieving the 37th Division during the same period that the 3d Division was relieving the 79th Division. Boundaries prescribed by the 3d Division were:

Right: Nantillois (incl.)—la Ville aux Bois Ferme (excl.)—Cunel (incl.).
Left: Bois de Beuge (incl.)—Romagne-sous-Montfaucon (excl.).

Sept.
16-25

Sept. 26-
Oct. 2

This left boundary did not become effective. The 3d Division extended no farther west than the left limit of the 79th Division, which had been in contact with the 37th Division in the northern edge of Bois de Beuge. [298, 299, 323]

The relief was completed about 6 p. m., September 30, by the 5th Infantry Brigade, with the 4th and 7th Infantry Regiments in line from right to left, each with its 1st Battalion in the front line. The line taken over extended from a point on the Nantillois—Cierges road about 300 meters northwest of Nantillois, thence southwest to the northern edge of Bois de Beuge, thence west along the edge of that wood to a point about 300 meters northwest of the summit of Hill 272. There was a gap between the right of the 4th Infantry and the left of the 4th Division, which rested on the southern slopes of Hill 274, but to the left the division was in contact with the 32d Division in the northern edge of Bois de Beuge. The 57th Field Artillery Brigade, 32d Division, which had been in support of the 79th Division, remained in support of the 3d Division until October 6. The 147th Field Artillery, 41st Division, was attached to the 57th Field Artillery Brigade during the same period. [1, 13, 300, 301, 302]

Company B, 4th Infantry, was moved on October 1 to the southern slopes of Hill 274 to maintain liaison with the left of the 4th Division. This company took over the lines on Hill 274 formerly held by the 4th Division as far as the divisional right boundary. [13, 303]

No changes occurred in the lines of the 3d Division on the 2d. A patrol of the 7th Infantry which was sent into the wood on Hill 268 during the night of October 1-2 was captured, but subsequent patrols during the day found the wood not held in force. The 4th Infantry also sent patrols into the wood. As a result of the patrolling, a platoon of Company F, 7th Infantry, moved into the wood during the night of October 2-3. A patrol of Company C, 7th Infantry, reconnoitered portions of the wood during the night, but returned to its former position in the northern edge of Bois de Beuge before daylight, October 3. [13, 304, 305, 306]

The 304th Engineers, 79th Division, was attached to the 3d

Division on October 2 and remained with it until October 7. [306]

The platoon of Company F, 7th Infantry, remained in the wood on Hill 268 throughout the day of October 3. About 6 p. m. the rest of the company moved into the wood, but was withdrawn about 11 p. m. for the purpose of relieving units of the 32d Division. [13] Oct. 3

Field orders of the V Corps issued during the morning of October 3, defined the right boundary of the division as the Nantillois—Cunel road (excl.)—Cunel (excl.). The front line was extended on the left to include Cierges, the left boundary being changed accordingly. Corps orders further directed an attack by the V Corps on the heights on both sides of Romagnesous-Montfaucon. A later memorandum announced that this attack would take place at 5:25 a. m., October 4. The 3d Division was ordered to assist the III Corps, to its right, in the capture of Bois des Ogons, Bois de Cunel and the heights east of Romagne. A rolling barrage was provided which was to advance at the rate of 100 meters each four minutes as far as Bois de Cunel, with pauses for 20 minutes on the enemy positions in Bois de Cunel, and just south of Cunel. Divisions were ordered to advance independently of one another as far as the combined army first-phase line, an east and west line just north of Bantheville. Any advance beyond this point was to be governed by subsequent orders. [307, 308]

At 7 p. m. the 3d Division directed the 5th Infantry Brigade to make the necessary changes in order to take over the new zone of action assigned by the corps orders. This necessitated a movement to the left by both regiments. The 7th Infantry completed the relief of the troops of the 32d Division by midnight, October 3, but the line of departure, the Nantillois—Cierges road, was not reached by the attacking troops until about dawn, October 4. Elements of the 4th Infantry near Nantillois, but not, however, those occupying positions in the front line, were relieved by elements of the 80th Division during the night of October 3-4. [13, 309, 310]

The 3d Division assigned the 5th Infantry Brigade to the assault echelon and placed the 6th Infantry Brigade in support.

The 5th Infantry Brigade prescribed the following formation for the attack:

<i>7th Infantry</i>	<i>4th Infantry</i>
2d Battalion	1st Battalion
1st Battalion	2d Battalion

Brigade Reserve

3d Battalion, 4th Infantry
3d Battalion, 7th Infantry

[13, 309, 311, 312]

Oct. 4 On the right, the 4th Infantry attacked at 5:25 a. m., October 4, following its barrage, and supported by the French 15th Tank Battalion. About 7 a. m. the assault battalion was held up by heavy fire on the northern edge of the wood on Hill 268, and it was found necessary to pass the support battalion through the leading battalion about 10 a. m. Meanwhile the tanks had gone forward, but the infantry was not able to advance more than 100 meters north of the wood on Hill 268 because of heavy machine-gun fire. Here the attack was stopped. [13, 313, 315]

Owing to the lack of time to accomplish the extension to the west, only one company of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was able to start its attack on time. The other companies joined the attack as they arrived. [314]

During the early morning the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, passed through companies of the 2d Battalion, and held the left of the line, elements advancing to the vicinity of the bridge over Ruisseau de Coup on the Cierges—Romagne road. Portions of the 2d Battalion veered to the right, and occupied positions slightly to the east of nose 241. [13, 316]

About noon, artillery assistance was requested by the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, but the artillery fire was put down too close to the troops and did not affect the enemy positions in the wood on nose 250. Early in the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was ordered from brigade reserve to assist the attack. Advanced elements of the battalion gained the southwestern slopes of Hill 253. [13, 317, 318]

About 4 p. m. the attack was renewed under cover of a

smoke screen. The 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, was unable to advance. To its left, a detachment of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, succeeded in crossing Ruisseau de Moussin, but on approaching Bois de Cunel, came under fire, and dug in about 200 meters south of the wood. It later abandoned this position. To the left of the 2d Battalion, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, made a slight advance. On the extreme left, the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, attacked to the west of the Cierges—Romagne road. No permanent gains were made, although on the extreme left the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, advanced to the vicinity of point 226, and elements of the battalion reached the southern slopes of Hill 253. At 5:30 p. m. the tanks withdrew for reorganization, all being out of action. At 6:25 p. m. the 5th Infantry Brigade ordered the 7th Infantry to hold, organize and establish liaison. [13, 312, 313, 316, 319, 320]

The right of the division was in liaison with the 80th Division by patrols in the vicinity of Source de Wilpré. During the evening liaison was secured between the 4th and 7th Infantry Regiments. The line extended east and west along the slopes north of Hill 268 and along nose 241. The positions of the 7th Infantry were held with the 2d Battalion on the right on the eastern portion of nose 241, the 1st Battalion in the center on the western slopes of the ridge, and the 3d Battalion on the left between the Cierges—Romagne road and the La Grange aux Bois Ferme—Romagne road, in contact with the 32d Division, about 300 meters north of crossroads 242 and about 100 meters east of the La Grange aux Bois Ferme—Romagne road. [316, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326]

The enemy held Hill 253 and the wood on nose 250 during the night of October 4-5. [13, 327]

At 10:50 p. m. the V Corps issued orders directing a resumption of the attack at 6:30 a. m., October 5, with the same zones of action and objectives as on the previous day. The 80th Division was to assist the advance of the 3d Division. At midnight, October 4, the 3d Division repeated these instructions to its units in field orders, stating that tanks would not be used in the attack and that the advance would be carried forward by infiltration. [328, 329]

Oct. 5

During the night of October 4-5, and on the following day, the enemy strengthened his position on Hill 253 with additional troops and several pieces of light artillery. [330]

On the right, the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, attacked just before dawn in a fog, but the fog lifted before the troops could reach the wood on nose 250 and the battalion was stopped by fire from the wood. During the morning, elements of the 4th Infantry succeeded in gaining the wood, but no organized line was established. At 11:05 a. m. another unsuccessful attempt to advance was made, after a 15-minute artillery preparation. Again following a 15-minute artillery preparation, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 4th Infantry, attempted at 2 p. m. to gain the wood, but at 4 p. m. no material advance had been made. After dark, groups had filtered as far north as the southern edge of the wood, and about 10 p. m. the 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, passed through the 1st and 2d Battalions, gaining the northern edge of the wood before midnight, and establishing an outpost line to the front. The line ran from its point of contact with the 80th Division 700 meters south of Ferme de la Madeleine to the southwest tip of the wood. [13, 316, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334]

At daybreak the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Infantry, were holding a line on nose 241, with units intermingled. The 3d Battalion, west of the Cierges—Romagne road, was ordered to attack Hill 253 from the west. The companies designated to lead the attack got into position in the vicinity of the western end of nose 241, but the attack was not launched. Small gains were made during the morning, but the enemy positions on Hill 253 dominated both the 4th and 7th Infantry Regiments. Another attack was scheduled for 5 p. m. with the 1st and 2d Battalions attacking to their front from their positions on nose 241, and with the 3d Battalion advancing to the Cunel—Romagne road which it was to hold. The attack got under way slowly, as the 3d Battalion was forced to cross the exposed Ruisseau de Coup in daylight in the face of enemy fire from Hill 253. The battalion advanced to the northeast in the dark, and by 11 p. m. had reached a line about 300 meters south of the crest of Hill 253. Patrols were sent to the right and left. The patrol to the right returned without having gained contact. The left patrol

reached the vicinity of Tranchée de la Mamelles. The line for the night was established, in liaison with the 4th Infantry to the right, from the southwest tip of the wood on nose 250, westward along the southern slopes of Hill 253, thence southwest to the point of contact with the 32d Division on the La Grange aux Bois Ferme—Romagne road, about 750 meters north of crossroads 242. The 3d Battalion held the front line, with the 1st and 2d Battalions in support. [13, 313, 316, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341]

At midnight, October 5, the 3d Division issued orders directing the organization of the sector for defense, with the 5th Infantry Brigade in the outpost zone, and the 6th Infantry Brigade occupying the main defensive position on the general line, Nantillois—Bois de Beuge—Bois Emont. [342]

At the same hour the V Corps issued orders directing its divisions to organize for further attack, and ordering the establishment of an outpost line to include especially Hill 268 in Bois de Cunel, and Hill 253. In case of an enemy attack, the 3d Division was to hold on its line of resistance. Corps and division artillery were given counterbattery missions to prevent hostile artillery fire on the front-line infantry. [343]

By daylight, October 6, the 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, had mopped up all of the wood on nose 250 west of the Nantillois—Cunel road. [344, 345]

Oct. 6

The front line of the 7th Infantry had been organized by 9 a. m. on the southern slopes of Hill 253, in the positions gained during the night of October 5-6. [346]

In the zone of action of the 4th Infantry, arrangements were made for a barrage on the southern edge of Bois de Cunel and points in the wood from 1 to 4 p. m., after which the 2d and 3d Battalions, 4th Infantry, were to attack Bois de Cunel, clear it and secure the trench which ran through its center. It was planned to execute this advance in conjunction with troops of the 80th Division, but before the attack started the 80th Division notified the 3d Division that its troops would be unable to advance. The attack of the right of the 3d Division took place as scheduled, but fire from Bois de Cunel and the crest of

Hill 253 was so intense that no gains could be made. [347, 348, 349, 350]

The front line of the 3d Division, during the night of October 6-7, was the same as that held during the night of October 5-6. The enemy still held the crest of Hill 253. Close contact to both flanks was maintained at the same points as during the night of October 5. [341, 351]

Oct. 7 About midnight, October 6, a provisional battalion of the 4th Infantry attempted to creep across the open space between the wood on nose 250 and Bois de Cunel, in order to gain a position from which to launch a surprise attack upon the latter wood at daylight. Three attempts were made between midnight and daylight to cross the clearing, but each attempt failed owing to the alertness of the enemy and the fatigue of the attacking troops. [352, 353]

No other attempt to attack was made by either the 4th Infantry or the 7th Infantry during the remainder of the day, and no change in the front line was effected on October 7. [353]

During the afternoon, the 3d Division directed the 6th Infantry Brigade to relieve the 5th Infantry Brigade during the night of October 7-8, completing the relief before daybreak, October 8. [354]

This relief had been directed by a corps order issued early in the morning. The same order had changed the west boundary of the 3d Division to a line, west edge of Bois de Beuge—Hill 253 (incl.)—Bantheville (incl.). [355]

Oct. 8 The relief of the 5th Infantry Brigade by the 6th Infantry Brigade was begun before midnight, October 7, and was completed by 3:30 a. m., with the exception of Company I, 7th Infantry, in the western part of the zone of action and Company D, 8th Machine-Gun Battalion, in the wood on nose 250. These units were not relieved until the following night. [13, 316]

Upon completion of the relief, the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, from right to left, held the front line. [313, 356, 357]

Early in the morning Company H, 38th Infantry, reached a line just below the crest of Hill 253, but was stopped there

by the enemy who continued to hold the crest and northern slopes of the hill. Company H withdrew later in the day through the line of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, located farther down the southern slope of the hill, in the positions formerly occupied by the 7th Infantry. [313, 358]

No change in the front line of the 3d Division was made on October 8. Contact with the 80th Division to the right, and the 32d Division to the left was maintained at the same points as on the previous night. [359]

In field orders issued during the evening, the 3d Division ordered the relief of the remaining troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade west of the new left boundary. [360]

Plans for an attack on October 9 were published by the V Corps in two field orders issued during the morning of October 7 and the morning of October 8. The hour of attack was announced as 8:30 a. m., October 9, following a 19½-hour artillery preparation. The 3d Division was assigned the mission of cleaning up Bois de Cunel, and was ordered to capture the portion of Tranchée de la Mamelle within its zone of action. It was further ordered to occupy Cunel and Bois de la Pultière, and to establish and maintain combat liaison with the 32d Division. [355, 362]

Pursuant to the field orders of the V Corps, the 3d Division designated the 6th Infantry Brigade as the assault unit, directing that the brigade attack with its regiments abreast, each regiment with one battalion in front line. A line of departure was provided for the right regiment along the northern edge of the wood on nose 250, and for the left regiment along Ruisseau de Moussin as far as the west edge of Bois de Cunel. The right regiment was ordered to attack at 8:30 a. m., and the left regiment at 9:30 a. m. In addition to the artillery preparation prescribed by the V Corps, a rolling barrage was provided, beginning at 8:30 a. m. in front of the right regiment, and at 9:30 a. m. in front of the left regiment. [363]

The 6th Infantry Brigade prescribed the following formation for the attack:

38th Infantry
3d Battalion
1st Battalion

30th Infantry
3d Battalion
2d Battalion

Brigade Reserve

1st Battalion, 30th Infantry
2d Battalion, 38th Infantry

[364]

A smoke screen was to be placed on the southern edge of Bois de Cunel at 8:20 a. m. by Company D, 1st Gas Regiment, to cover the advance of the 30th Infantry. As soon as the barrage reached the vicinity of the Cunel—Romagne road, the high ground approximately 300 meters south of that road was to be organized in depth for defense. [364]

At the same time, the 30th Infantry was ordered to send one infantry company and one machine-gun platoon to clean up Cunel. When the town had been mopped up and occupied, it was to send another company and a platoon of machine guns to clean up and occupy Bois de la Pultière, establishing strong-points along its northeastern and northwestern edges. [364]

Troops of the 32d Division relieved troops of the 38th Infantry and Company I, 7th Infantry, west of the new boundary between midnight, October 8, and daylight, October 9. Company D, 8th Machine-Gun Battalion, on nose 250, was relieved during the same night by units of the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion. [13, 365, 366]

At 2:45 a. m. the 3d Division notified the 6th Infantry Brigade that the hour of attack of the 30th Infantry had been changed from 8:30 a. m. to 9:12 a. m., and that of the 38th Infantry from 9:30 a. m. to 10:30 a. m. The 30th Infantry postponed its attack as directed. In the 38th Infantry, however, the message reached the leading battalion about 5:15 a. m., but a message sent to the two support companies of the battalion at 7 a. m. was not delivered in time to stop the advance of these companies about 9:30 a. m. [13, 367, 368, 369, 370]

On the right, the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion in support, advanced through a heavy mist and a smoke screen to the southern edge of Bois de Cunel. About 10 a. m. it entered the wood, and received fire from Ferme de la Madeleine. Elements of Companies K and L engaged in a fire fight with troops at the farm. Later, Companies E and F, of the leading wave of the support battalion, attacked and succeeded in capturing the farm. The 80th Division had not advanced to the right. [13, 371]

By noon the attack had reached the northern edge of Bois de Cunel, where a line was consolidated, although enemy snipers were still in the wood. Contact with the 38th Infantry had been lost in the mist and smoke at the start of the attack. The 2d and 3d Battalions were intermingled at noon, and mixed elements of both battalions organized portions of the line. During the afternoon the enemy withdrew to the trenches north of the wood on Hill 272. Contact was reestablished with the right of the 38th Infantry, and was maintained for the remainder of the day and night. At 3:30 p. m. the 80th Division advanced and Company F, 30th Infantry, on the extreme right of the 3d Division, was ordered to advance with the troops of the 80th Division. Farther advance on the right was not made, as the 80th Division did not advance past the northeast corner of Bois de Cunel. Liaison was maintained at that point throughout the night of October 9-10. [13, 372, 373, 374, 375]

At 3:20 p. m. the 6th Infantry Brigade ordered a general advance to the line, Aincreville—Bantheville, and the 30th Infantry was directed to complete its mission and clean up Cunel and Bois de la Pultière. The troops were unable to advance, however, and the 1st Battalion was released from brigade reserve to make the attack after passing through the intermingled 2d and 3d Battalions. [13, 376]

It was planned to begin the attack behind a rolling barrage at midnight, October 9, after a 10-minute artillery concentration on the German trenches on Hill 272. The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, arrived on the line of departure, the

northern edge of Bois de Cunel, about 11:45 p. m. and was there notified that the attack was postponed until 7 a. m. the following day. [377, 378]

During the evening the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was released from division reserve and took up positions in the southern part of Bois de Cunel, to support the attack of the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry. The 30th Infantry did not move forward during the night of October 9-10, but held the line along the northern edge of Bois de Cunel, with portions of all three battalions in line. [13, 313, 379, 380]

About 10 a. m., when the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, on the left had reached a point opposite the southern edge of Bois de Cunel, it was stopped by fire from Bois de Cunel, and from the crest of Hill 253. At 10:30 a. m. Company M was sent to the left to flank the enemy on the crest of Hill 253, and Company L was sent to the right to clean out the southwestern edge of Bois de Cunel. About this time Company A, which was endeavoring to establish contact with the 3d Battalion, joined Company M in the attack on Hill 253. With this assistance the remainder of the 3d Battalion was able to drive out the machine guns west of Hill 253 and enfilade the enemy on the hill. [381, 382]

By 11:05 a. m. the leading elements of the 38th Infantry were in the vicinity of Fontaine Moussin, and about noon entered Tranchée de la Mamelle. Units of both the 1st and 3d Battalions were in the assault echelon. Company K was sent to the left to protect that flank, since liaison with the 32d Division had been lost. A patrol from the company reached Romagnous-Montfaucon and took prisoners in the town. By 1:30 p. m. the advance had reached the enemy positions near point 255, and isolated groups of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 38th Infantry, had filtered across the Cunel—Romagne road. [383]

The greater part of the troops engaged were occupied during the afternoon in organizing Tranchée de la Mamelle for defense. No organized attempts were made to put into execution the orders of the 6th Infantry Brigade to move to the Aincreville—Bantheviller line and establish a line of resistance to the north of the road. During the afternoon the 2d Battalion, 38th In-

fantry, was released from brigade reserve, and about dusk moved forward and relieved the units of the 1st and 3d Battalions in Tranchée de la Mamelle. Elements of these organizations which had moved forward during the afternoon were withdrawn, and Tranchée de la Mamelle was held and consolidated for the night by the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, with advance posts well to the front. Liaison to the right with the 30th Infantry had been secured about 2 p. m. and was continuous from that time during the remainder of the day and the night of October 9-10. Contact was secured to the left with the 32d Division in Tranchée de la Mamelle in the vicinity of the divisional left boundary. [384, 385]

The line of the 3d Division for the night ran from the northeastern edge of Bois de Cunel on the right boundary, along the northern edge of this wood, thence along Tranchée de la Mamelle to the left boundary. [313]

At 11 p. m. the V Corps issued orders stating that the corps would advance at 7 a. m., October 10, to the general line, Bantheville—Sommerance, about 7 kilometers west of Romagne. The 3d Division was ordered to advance to the line, northern edge of Bois des Rappes—eastern edge of Bois de Chauvignon. It was to protect its right flank by establishing close contact with the 80th Division, advancing its right in conjunction with the 80th Division. No prescribed corps scheme of artillery fire was provided, although corps artillery was directed to assist the attack by all possible means. [387, 388]

At midnight, October 9, the 3d Division issued field orders announcing that its troops had broken through the Hindenburg Line, and directing an attack in accordance with the corps orders. These orders directed the taking of Bantheville and the heights to the east and west, organizing the line thus gained, and pushing out strong reconnoitering parties to the combined army first-phase line, an east and west line just north of Bantheville. [389]

About 7 a. m., October 10, the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, relieved the merged 2d and 3d Battalions, in the northern edge of Bois de Cunel. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved to Ferme de la Madeleine at 5 a. m. to support the attack of the

Oct. 10

30th Infantry. Between 8 and 9 a. m. the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, attacked the ridge, Hill 272—point 255. The advanced elements reached the crest of the ridge, but could not hold it. [13, 390]

About 4 p. m. the advanced elements were recalled, and an artillery concentration was laid on the enemy positions. The concentration continued until 6 p. m. when another advance was attempted, but no gains were made. [13]

A renewal of the attack was planned for 9:45 p. m., in which the 1st and 2d Battalions, 30th Infantry, assisted by the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, were ordered to take the ridge and hold it. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, attacking on the right with its right on the Nantillois—Cunel road, had made no gains by midnight. The intermingled troops of the 30th Infantry, attacking to the northwest, lost direction in the dark, and reached the crest of Hill 272 about midnight. No organized line was established, however, although isolated parties held positions in the vicinity of this crest throughout the night of October 10–11. [13]

The line at midnight was the same as that held during the night of October 9–10, in contact with the 80th Division to the right and the 38th Infantry to the left at the same points as on the night of October 9–10. [313]

When the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, on the left, attacked at 7 a. m., it found itself held up by fire from the front and both flanks. A heavy rolling barrage, commencing at 7:35 a. m., assisted the attack, and strong concentration fire was put on known enemy strongpoints. Nevertheless, the battalion was unable to advance during the day, although it sent patrols to the front and flanks. These advanced elements succeeded in gaining positions in the trenches on the western portion of ridge 255, but were ordered to retire after dark to their original positions in Tranchée de la Mamelle, where they maintained contact with the 30th Infantry to their right. No further dispositions or changes in lines were made during the night. Contact to the left was maintained in Tranchée de la Mamelle with the 32d Division, as on the previous night. [13, 391, 392, 393]

At 4:10 p. m., October 10, the remainder of the 7th Infantry

was placed at the disposal of the 6th Infantry Brigade. The 1st Battalion, supporting the 38th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, supporting the 30th Infantry and attacking with it during the evening, were already attached to that brigade. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, became brigade reserve. [316]

The V Corps issued field orders at 9 p. m. announcing that the attack of October 11 would take place at 7 a. m., and assigning new boundaries to the 3d Division. The east boundary was changed to a line, Cunel (excl.)—Bois des Rappes (excl.); the west boundary was a line, Romagne (excl.)—Remonville, about 5 kilometers northwest of Bantheville (excl.). At 9:45 p. m. the 3d Division repeated the provisions of the corps orders assigning the same mission as for October 10. The division was ordered to attack with the utmost vigor without waiting for adjacent divisions or permitting its advance to be delayed by isolated machine-gun nests. [394, 395]

The attack, begun at 9:45 p. m., October 10, by the intermingled units of the 30th Infantry, supported by the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was stopped about 2 a. m., October 11, and a line was established on the southern slope of Hill 272. A counterattack at dawn was repulsed. [13, 396]

Oct. 11

During the night of October 10–11 the 7th Infantry took command of the right half of the divisional zone of action, with the mission of passing the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Infantry, through the depleted battalions of the 30th Infantry. About 3 a. m. the 3d Battalion, released from reserve of the 6th Infantry Brigade, proceeded to the vicinity of Ferme de la Madeleine, whence it was directed to march to the northwestern edge of Bois de Cunel. While this change of position was in progress about 7 a. m., the remnants of the 30th Infantry, assisted by the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the right, renewed the attack of the night before, and by 8:30 a. m. held an advanced line on the crest of Hill 272, although the western portion of the ridge, in the vicinity of point 255, was still held by the enemy with machine guns which immobilized the 38th Infantry to the west. [13, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401]

During the morning Company E, 4th Infantry, liaison detachment with the 80th Division, had advanced with its

right in contact with the latter, and its left in contact with the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry. About 9 a. m. the 80th and 3d Divisions agreed to attack the town of Cunel together, and the troops on the right of the 3d Division were ordered to assist in this attack. By noon, troops of the 80th Division were in the northern edge of Bois de Malaumont, and at the same hour Company E, 4th Infantry, with troops of the 80th Division, advanced to the attack on Cunel. [316, 402, 403, 404]

The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, which had held the trenches on the summit of Hill 272 during the morning with advanced elements in the vicinity of the Cunel—Romagne road, joined the attack on Cunel with troops of the 80th Division and Company E, 4th Infantry. To the left of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the ridge 272—255, were mixed elements of the 30th Infantry, but the western end of this ridge was still held by the enemy. [13, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409]

About this time the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was ordered to attack from the northwestern edge of Bois de Cunel and clean up this ridge. By 1:20 p. m. the entire eastern portion of the ridge had been taken, and the remainder of the day was spent in consolidation and reorganization. No further organized advance in the right of the divisional zone of action was made during the day. The line at midnight extended along the ridge from its junction with the 80th Division on the Cunel—Nantillois road, about 400 meters south of Cunel, to its point of contact with the 38th Infantry in Tranchée de la Mamelles. [410, 411, 412, 413]

On the left, the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, moved to the attack at 7:15 a. m., but was held up by the hostile machine guns on the western end of ridge 272—255. The attacking troops were forced to withdraw to Tranchée de la Mamelles about 8 a. m. Shortly after 1 p. m., following the advance of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, upon the machine guns on the western end of the ridge, Companies E and F, 38th Infantry, started an advance which reached the Romagne—Cunel road, with advanced elements beyond it. By 2:30 p. m. the line was established on the crest south of this road. The battalion held this position until dusk; when a retirement was ordered to

Tranchée de la Mamelle. This retirement was carried out, and the line for the night established again in Tranchée de la Mamelle, in liaison with the 32d Division near the divisional left boundary. [414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419]

At 7 p. m., the V Corps announced that the enemy appeared to be holding strongly on the corps front. Divisions were ordered to organize their zones for defense, while preparing for a further advance upon receipt of orders. Strong reconnaissance patrols were ordered forward to maintain contact with the enemy. [420]

At 11 p. m., the 3d Division announced that the east boundary would be unchanged, but that the west boundary would be the Cierges—Romagne road (incl.)—Romagne (excl.). This new boundary was about 800 meters west of the junction of the boundary of October 11 with Tranchée de la Mamelle, and ran slightly west of north through Croix du Calvaire. The organization of the zone in depth was assigned to the 6th Infantry Brigade. The relief of the 32d Division in the small portion of Tranchée de la Mamelle newly assigned to the 3d Division was ordered completed before daylight, October 12. This new boundary was again changed the following day, after only a small portion of the front line of the 32d Division had been taken over by the 3d Division. [421]

During the night of October 11–12 the 80th Division was relieved by the 5th Division. No changes were made on the right of the 3d Division. [313, 421]

No attacks were made during the day. The ground gained on October 11 was consolidated, and units were reorganized. On the left, the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, took over about 300 meters of Tranchée de la Mamelle west of its former position, and remained in close contact with troops of the 32d Division. [13, 422, 423, 424, 425]

Oct. 12

Pursuant to field orders of the First Army, the V Corps issued field orders at 10 a. m. transferring the 3d Division to the tactical control of the III Corps, and making a slight change in the west boundary of the division, so that this line ran, center of Bois de Beuge—Romagne (excl.)—road junction 750 meters west of Le Grand Carré Ferme. This change was to

be effective at 3 p. m. The 3d Division was now the left division of the III Corps. The III Corps had the 4th, 5th and 3d Divisions in line from right to left. The French XVII Corps was to its right, and the American V Corps to its left. The 32d Division remained to the left of the 3d Division. The 16th Field Artillery and one battalion of the 13th Field Artillery, 4th Division, were attached to the 3d Division. [1, 313, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430]

At 7:15 p. m. the 3d Division issued field orders which prescribed that the 30th Infantry would relieve a battalion of the 5th Division from positions on Hill 272 to the southwest corner of Bois de Forêt. This relief was to be made during the night of October 12-13, and be completed before daylight, October 13. Two battalions of the 4th Infantry were ordered to relieve elements of the 4th Division the same night from the east end of Bois de Peut-de-Faux, northwest to the west end of Bois de Forêt. The zones thus assigned overlapped somewhat, as their junction was not precisely defined. Upon the completion of these reliefs, the 5th Infantry Brigade was to take command of the 4th and 30th Infantry Regiments, as the right brigade, and the 6th Infantry Brigade to assume command of the 7th and 38th Infantry Regiments. The 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, was designated as division reserve. [431]

The division orders made no change in its west boundary, but changed the east boundary to a north and south line through Bois de Fays along vertical grid line 12 to the crossing of that line and Fond de Ville aux Bois, thence northeast to the crossing of vertical grid line 13 with the Romagne—Brieulles road, thence generally northeast to the Meuse River, crossing that river about 400 meters south of Source de l'Ile Gifet. Daylight reconnaissance was ordered. Company E, 4th Infantry, assigned as liaison detachment between the 80th and 3d Divisions, had remained in its position in the vicinity of the Nantillois—Cunel road during the night relief of the 80th Division and during the day, and was ordered to continue its liaison mission during the night of October 12-13. [431, 432, 433]

Advance parties of the 4th and 30th Infantry Regiments passed through Ferme de la Madeleine about 6:30 p. m. The

advance to the new positions continued during the evening. At 10:55 p. m., owing to the slight overlapping of lines assigned the 4th Infantry on the right and the 30th Infantry on the left, the 4th Infantry reported that it was relieving a battalion of the 5th Division in the southwestern portion of Bois de Forêt. It was directed to relieve elements of the 4th Division only. The relief proceeded without further incident, and was in progress at midnight. [313]

The line on the left, in the former divisional zone, remained as on the night of October 11-12, with the exception of the extension westward in Tranchée de la Mamelle. [13]

On the right, the 4th Infantry found that units of the 5th Division, considering themselves in the front line, were in rear of units of the 4th Division, but in the darkness the 4th Infantry continued through these units of the 5th Division, and completed the relief of the 4th Division units in the front line on the 13th. The line taken over extended from a point in the southern edge of Bois de Forêt just south of the saddle between Hills 297 and 298, thence northwest to the crossing of vertical grid line 12 with horizontal grid line 86, thence west and southwest along the northern edge of Bois de Forêt, to the point where vertical grid line 11 enters the wood. [313, 316, 434]

Oct. 13

The relief of the 5th Division was completed during the afternoon. The 30th Infantry continued the line of the 4th Infantry to the southwest, to its junction with the 7th Infantry on the Nantillois—Cunel road, about 400 meters south of Cunel. The 7th Infantry took over the whole zone formerly occupied by its own units and by the 30th Infantry, and the 38th Infantry continued in its positions along Tranchée de la Mamelle. The strength of the 30th Infantry was considerably below that of a war-strength battalion, therefore, it was reorganized into four provisional companies, although attempts at battalion designations were continued. [13, 316, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 497, 504]

The order of battle was as follows:

<i>6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE</i>		<i>5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE</i>	
<i>38th Infantry</i>	<i>7th Infantry</i>	<i>30th Infantry</i>	<i>4th Infantry</i>
2d Battalion	2d Battalion	1st Battalion	1st Battalion
3d Battalion	3d Battalion	2d Battalion	3d Battalion
1st Battalion		3d Battalion	
<i>Brigade Reserve</i>			
1st Battalion, 7th Infantry			
<i>DIVISION RESERVE</i>			
2d Battalion, 4th Infantry			

[435, 439, 440]

Although no attacks were planned and no changes in line made during the day, the III Corps during the morning ordered patrols to be sent out to seize the eastern and northeastern edges of Bois de Forêt, and ascertain the situation in Brieuilles. [441]

From 2:20 p. m. to 3:25 p. m. the enemy put down heavy artillery fire along the entire front, particularly on the extreme right, and followed this bombardment by a determined attack. In the zone of the 4th Infantry, no ground was given up, although it was found necessary to send forward companies of the reserve battalion. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, caught in an unfavorable position, withdrew slightly to escape the artillery fire, but before 4 p. m. had returned to their original positions. The brunt of the attack fell on the 4th Infantry. No determined attacks were made on the left of the 30th Infantry, or on the remainder of the line. [316, 442]

No changes in dispositions or lines were made during the night. Contact with the 32d Division was maintained, but there was a gap of about 1 kilometer between the front line of the 4th Infantry, and the 4th Division to the right. [436, 437, 443]

At 3 a. m. the III Corps had issued field orders for an attack on October 14. The main effort was to be made in the direction, Bois de Cunel—Bantherville—le Grand Carré Ferme. The III Corps was to capture the high ground north of Bantheville, in conjunction with the V Corps to its left. The 3d Division was designated as the supporting division, and was to

protect the flank of the 5th Division, which was to make the main attack. The 5th Division was to pass through the line held by the 3d Division between Cunel and Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, and attack behind a deep rolling barrage. [430]

The 3d Division was to hold its front line until the attack of the 5th Division had begun and then was to advance to the line, southeast corner of Bois de Peut-de-Faux—thence north to the ravine east of Côte 299—thence northwest to the northern edge of Clairs Chênes wood—thence south to the southeast corner of Bois de la Pultière. The east boundary remained unchanged. The west boundary was to remain the west boundary of the III Corps and was defined as a line, Bois de Cunel (incl.)—Fontaine de Lawouis (excl.)—Bantheville (incl.)—road junction about 750 meters west of Le Grand Carré Ferme. [430]

A rolling barrage was provided for the advance of the 3d Division, with artillery concentrations on Cunel and on the southeastern and western edges of Bois de la Pultière. The southeastern and southwestern borders of this wood were to be gassed to a depth of 300 meters. At the same time Clairs Chênes wood, Derrière la Côte de Forêt, and Les Aisements Bois were to be gassed. This artillery support was to be furnished by one regiment and one battalion of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade of the 4th Division, which replaced the organic artillery of the 3d Division, detailed by corps orders to support the 5th Division. [430]

At 7:30 p. m. the 3d Division issued field orders announcing the hour of attack as 8:30 a. m., and prescribing an advance in two phases to the objective assigned in the corps orders. The 30th Infantry was charged with cleaning up Bois de la Pultière and Bois des Rappes in conjunction with the troops of the 5th Division, which were to attack to their left. The left battalion, 4th Infantry, was ordered to execute a turning movement against Côte 299, while the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, less Company E, from division reserve, was to advance directly on Côte 299, and Clairs Chênes wood, from positions in readiness in the northern edge of Bois de Peut-de-Faux. The line, northeast corner of Bois de Peut-de-Faux—Côte 299, was to be

organized in depth. Strong patrols were to be sent through Bois de Forêt and to Hill 281. Company E, 4th Infantry, was to continue its combat-liaison mission between the 5th and 3d Divisions. [445]

No definite boundary between the 3d and 5th Divisions after the passage of lines by the 5th Division was designated in orders either by the III Corps or by the 3d Division. Field orders of the 5th Division, however, defined the boundary between the 3d and 5th Divisions as the line, west edge of wood 500 meters east of Cunel—east edge of Bois de la Pultière (to 3d Division)—east edge of Clairs Chênes wood (to 3d Division). [446]

Oct. 14

At 8:30 a. m., the 5th Division passed through the lines of the 7th and 38th Infantry Regiments which, for the time being, remained in position. [447, 448]

On the right, the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, less Company E, was held up by shellfire before it could leave its positions, and lost the barrage. No appreciable advance had been made by noon and the turning movement against Côte 299 by the 1st Battalion was delayed pending the advance of the 2d Battalion. [13, 449]

The 5th Division was held up on a general line, Cunel—Ravin des Perrières, by fire from Bois des Rappes, and enfilade artillery fire from across the Meuse. By 1 p. m. the 30th Infantry, which was to advance between the 4th Infantry and the 5th Division, had made no appreciable gains toward taking Bois de la Pultière. [450, 451]

At 10:47 a. m. the 3d Division ordered the entire 7th Infantry assembled at La Ville aux Bois Ferme, and placed it at the disposal of the 5th Infantry Brigade. About noon the 38th Infantry was ordered to move one battalion to the right to take over the portion of the line vacated by the 7th Infantry south and southwest of Cunel. During the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, moved into this portion of the line, and sent patrols into Cunel. These patrols found no enemy in the town, but reported that 5th Division troops were attacking hostile machine guns on the hill just to the north. [452, 453, 454]

In the early afternoon, groups of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 4th Infantry, succeeded in approaching La Mi-Noël wood, but by 3:10 p. m. had not succeeded in advancing in any effective force to the east of Clairs Chênes wood. By 2:30 p. m. units of the 5th Division had moved into Bois de la Pultière to clean up the wood, a mission similar to that of the 30th Infantry. The 30th Infantry sent out patrols which reached the northern edge of Bois de la Pultière, and later in the afternoon the remainder of the 30th Infantry pushed through the wood to the northern edge, in conjunction with troops of the 5th Division. By 6:20 p. m. a line was established in the northern edge of the wood. The left of the 30th Infantry was about in the center of the northern edge of the wood, in contact with the 5th Division, whose line extended to the southwest from a point about 500 meters south of the northern edge of the wood. [13, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459]

At 3:40 p. m. the 3d Division assigned one battalion of the 7th Infantry to the 4th Infantry to aid it in its attack. This battalion, the 1st, arrived at the command post of the 4th Infantry about 4 p. m. and was put into the line before midnight. During the late afternoon the advanced elements of the 4th Infantry which had gained the vicinity of La Mi-Noël wood, were withdrawn between the left of the 4th Infantry and the right of the 30th Infantry in Bois de la Pultière. The right of the 4th Infantry remained as on the preceding night, with no direct contact with the 4th Division to the right. [316, 460, 461]

In the early evening the III Corps issued field orders announcing the continuation of the attack at 7:30 a. m., October 15. The 3d Division was ordered to gain the northern edge of Bois des Rappes, Clairs Chênes wood, Côte 299, and to clean up the eastern part of Bois de Forêt. It was to establish liaison with the 5th Division in the northern edge of Bois des Rappes, and establish outposts to the north and east. [462]

Pursuant to these orders, the 3d Division directed that the attack would be pushed with the utmost vigor. Later, in a memorandum, the division repeated in detail the mission assigned it by the field orders of the III Corps. [463, 464]

About 3:30 a. m., October 15, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, advanced between Bois de la Pultière and

Oct. 15

Bois de Forêt to take Clairs Chênes wood, but were unsuccessful. [461]

There was a great shortage of officers and men in the three front-line regiments, the 4th, 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments, and companies and battalions had been reduced below the strengths of platoons and companies, respectively. During the night of October 14-15 the 4th Infantry was reorganized into two provisional battalions, to the first of which were attached the two remaining companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry. The 1st Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry, advanced against Côte 299 before daylight, but in the darkness the guides lost their way and the hill was not attacked. The 2d Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry, was ordered to advance eastward in Bois de Forêt. One company was assigned as a liaison unit in Bois de Peut-de-Faux, between the 4th Infantry and the 4th Division. [13, 465, 466, 467, 468]

Under the direct orders of the division commander, the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, advanced during the morning through Bois de la Pultière, encountering heavy machine-gun opposition. This battalion, with the remnants of the 30th Infantry which had remained in the wood during the night of October 14-15, attempted an attack on Clairs Chênes wood, but no ground was gained during the day. [13]

The scheduled attack was slow in starting on the front of the 4th Infantry, owing to the slow advance of the two companies of the 7th Infantry to its left. However, by 10:30 a. m. the 1st Provisional Battalion had cleaned out the gully, Fond Diné, and the companies of the 7th Infantry were advancing abreast of it. The two companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, sent against Clairs Chênes wood at 3:30 a. m., attempted several times to gain a foothold in the wood, but these attempts were unsuccessful. To their right, the 1st Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry, made repeated attempts to advance on La Mi-Noël wood. [469, 470]

At noon the 4th Infantry requested the use of a company of the 6th Engineers. Company C, 6th Engineers, reported for this duty at 2:45 p. m. The company was moved to the cut in the gully north of Fond Diné about 5 p. m., and was ready to

attack at 9 p. m. At 10:30 p. m. it attacked La Mi-Noël wood, but after gaining the crest north of point 265, was forced to dig in on the reverse slope of La Grève, where the line was established for the night. [316, 471]

During the afternoon the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was moved to the southern edge of Bois de Forêt, relieving the liaison troops of the 4th Infantry in these positions. Although called support positions, they were front-line positions because of the exposed flank. [13]

At midnight, October 14, the 38th Infantry had begun its move to the vicinity of La Ville aux Bois Ferme, in division reserve, but after commencing to withdraw from its positions south and southwest of Cunel, the 1st Battalion was ordered to return to the trenches it had formerly occupied. The battalion stayed in these positions during the day, while the remainder of the regiment went into division reserve as ordered. [472]

On the extreme right, the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, held the line formerly occupied by the 4th Infantry, and although not in contact with the 4th Division to its right, maintained liaison by patrols. From the southeastern edge of Bois de Peut-de-Faux, the line extended around the eastern edge of the wood, thence to the northwest until it reached the cut northeast of Fond Diné, thence to the north and west on the reverse slope of La Grève, thence northwest, in the northern edge of Bois de la Pultière, where contact was maintained with the 5th Division. [13, 473]

At 10 p. m. the 3d Division issued field orders announcing that there was to be no attack on October 16, and directing that the objectives prescribed on October 14, Bois de la Pultière and Bois des Rappes, should be organized in depth. Patrols were ordered to clean up Clairs Chênes wood and the eastern portion of Bois de Forêt. Outposts were ordered established to the north and east. [474]

During the night of October 15-16 the remnants of the 30th Infantry were withdrawn from Bois de la Pultière, and re-organized into a provisional company under the 6th Infantry Brigade, the machine-gun company only, of the combat troops, retaining its identity. Positions were taken on the hill south

Oct. 16

of Cunel. During the same night Companies B and C, 38th Infantry, in reserve of the 6th Infantry Brigade, to which the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was now assigned, moved forward into Bois de la Pultière and joined the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, in the wood. During the morning of October 16 these troops made an unsuccessful attempt to take Clairs Chênes wood. No other organized attacks were made in the 3d Division's zone of action during the day. [313, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479]

At 2 a. m. the III Corps issued field orders directing its divisions to hold and organize in depth the ground they then occupied. Divisions were to be prepared to attack upon further orders. The left boundary of the 3d Division was prescribed for the first time by the III Corps since the relief by the 5th Division on October 14. The new left boundary was a line, Cunel (excl.)—Bois de la Pultière (excl.)—Bois des Rappes (excl.)—Aincreville (incl.). The elements of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade, attached to the 3d Division, were returned to corps artillery. [480]

The 3d Division issued field orders in the afternoon putting into effect the provisions of the corps orders and directing the 5th Infantry Brigade to occupy the forward area and relieve 6th Infantry Brigade organizations during the night of October 16-17, with the 4th Infantry on the right, and the 7th Infantry on the left. [481]

During the evening the III Corps issued field orders directing the 3d Division to mop up Bois de Forêt and Clairs Chênes wood, and to consolidate all ground gained to the north. This was followed by orders of the 3d Division at 9 p. m. announcing that the mission of the division was unchanged and prescribing that the front line would be improved and strengthened throughout. [482, 483]

At 8:15 p. m., the 5th Infantry Brigade issued field orders covering details of the relief as prescribed in the division orders, and further ordering the 7th Infantry to relieve Company C, 6th Engineers, on La Grève. [484]

Oct. 17 During the relief of the 6th Infantry Brigade by the 5th Infantry Brigade, troops of the 5th Division relieved those

elements of the 6th Infantry Brigade in Bois de la Pultière, completing the relief of Companies B and C, 38th Infantry, by 1:30 p. m., October 17 and the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, by 8 a. m., October 18. [485, 486, 487, 488]

Owing to the fact that the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, did not receive its orders to relieve the 4th Infantry on the left until 5 a. m., the relief was not commenced until about dusk, and was completed by 8:30 p. m. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, took over the zone of the 1st Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry, from the vicinity of the crossing of vertical grid line 12 and horizontal grid line 86, to the divisional left boundary, along the line formerly held by troops of the 4th Infantry, Company C of the 6th Engineers and the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry. The 2d Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry, continued to hold the same positions in Bois de Forêt and the eastern edge of Bois de Peut-de-Faux that it had previously held in conjunction with the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry. Liaison with the 4th Division was maintained by patrols. There was direct contact with the 5th Division at the divisional boundary. [13, 313, 316, 489]

Throughout the day there were indications of an enemy withdrawal and at 9:20 p. m. the 3d Division ordered the 5th Infantry Brigade to occupy Clairs Chênes wood, Côte 299 and the northern and eastern portions of Bois de Forêt, if it should be determined that the enemy had actually withdrawn. [490, 491]

At 10 p. m. the III Corps ordered the 3d Division to continue its operations in Bois de Forêt and Clairs Chênes wood. [492]

There was no activity other than patrolling on October 18 on the front of the 3d Division. [313, 493]

Oct. 18

Although no formal field orders were issued by the III Corps, it was arranged between the 3d and 4th Divisions that the 6th Infantry Brigade would relieve the 4th Division during the night of October 18-19 on the line, junction of Fond de la Côte de Laimont and the railroad—northwest edge of Bois de la Côte Lémont—north edge of Bois de Briulles—northeast edge of Bois de Fays. [313]

Relief of the 4th Division by the 6th Infantry Brigade was begun at nightfall, October 18, and was completed before 7 a. m.,

October 19. The front-line troops of the 4th Division were relieved before midnight, October 18. [494]

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 38th Infantry, relieved the 3d and 2d Battalions of the 47th Infantry, respectively. The 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, held the northern edge of Bois de Briulles. The 30th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, along the northwestern edge of Bois de la Côte Lémont. [495, 496]

The 5th Division was to attack at 3 p. m. and the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, sent out a liaison group to maintain contact. It also sent three patrols toward Côte 299 to ascertain whether the enemy was retiring in the vicinity of that hill. The liaison group to the left did not gain contact, only a few small groups of the 5th Division being successful in advancing. The patrols to the front met enemy machine-gun fire and were forced to return to their lines. [13, 313]

The right flank of the 3d Division during the night of October 18-19 was in contact with the left of the 33d Division near the new divisional boundary in the vicinity of Fond de la Côte de Laimont. The left flank of the 3d Division was in contact with the 5th Division at the same point as on the previous night. [498, 499]

Oct. 19 No change in the front of the 3d Division was made on October 19. The day was spent in making preparations for an attack to be launched the next day. [313]

At midnight, October 18, the III Corps ordered that on the morning of October 20 its divisions would drive in enemy outposts with a view to developing the Freya Stellung, which was in process of organization along a general line, Côte 261, west of Cléry-le-Petit—Aincreville. The relief of the 4th Division by the 3d Division made the latter the right division of the III Corps. The 5th Division was to attack in conjunction with the 3d Division. The 16th Field Artillery, 4th Division, was attached to the 3d Division for the attack. [428, 500, 501]

At 5 p. m., October 19, the 3d Division issued field orders giving details of the attack and later in the evening announced the hour of attack as 7 a. m. The mission of the 3d Division was to clean out Clairs Chênes wood and hold it at all costs and

seize and hold Côte 299. The eastern limit of the attack was designated as a north and south line through the east edge of Côte 299; and the western limit as a line, east edge of Bois de la Pultière—east edge of Bois des Rappes. The 5th Infantry Brigade was charged with the attack, and designated the following troops for that purpose: one battalion, 7th Infantry, reinforced by Companies A and B, and two platoons, Company E, 6th Engineers; Company A, 1st Gas Regiment; and as reserve, one battalion, 4th Infantry. The engineer troops were ordered to provide wire and heavy tools and consolidate the positions taken. A combat-liaison group of one platoon of infantry with machine guns was assigned to establish and maintain liaison with the 5th Division to the left. [501, 502, 503]

Nonpersistent gas was to be placed on the woods north of Côte 299 and in the northwestern part of Bois de Forêt in two heavy 10-minute concentrations commencing at 1 a. m. and 3:50 a. m. One hour of fire of destruction was to be placed on Clairs Chênes wood, commencing at 5:50 a. m. At 6:55 a. m. a rolling barrage was to commence in the southern part of the wood, and was to advance at the rate of 100 meters in 10 minutes. When a line 300 meters beyond the northern edge of the wood was reached, the barrage was to remain stationary for 30 minutes and was then to cease. From 7 a. m. until a rocket signal by the infantry, heavy fire was to be placed on Hill 297 and Côte 299, north of La Mi-Noël wood. Upon further infantry advance, fire was to be placed on the woods north and east of those hills. [501]

Field orders of the 5th Infantry Brigade prescribed that the northern and eastern edges of Clairs Chênes wood would be taken before the attack on Côte 299 commenced. The operation was to be carried out by the 7th Infantry, which was ordered to form a provisional company from its support and reserve battalions. When this order was issued, the amended field orders of the 3d Field Artillery Brigade, based on the division field order, had not been received, and the brigade orders announced that there would be no rolling barrage. Combat groups were

assigned to operate on each flank. The northeastern edge of Bois de la Pultière was designated as the line of departure. [505]

The flank combat groups, from advanced positions in Bois des Rappes and the small triangular wood just west of La Grève, were directed to be in position at 1 a. m., October 20, to prevent the enemy from advancing into the edge of Bois de la Pultière to avoid the gas and barrage. As soon as the attack began, these troops were to join the advance. [505]

The troops attacking in Clairs Chênes wood were ordered to advance in two columns. The two assaulting platoons were to push through to the northern edge of the wood to organize it for defense, and the support platoons were to mop up. [505]

During the night of October 19-20 the Provisional 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, relieved the Provisional 2d Battalion in the positions in Bois de Forêt and in the eastern edge of Bois de Peut-de-Faux. [506]

Oct. 20 The attack commenced as scheduled at 7 a. m., October 20, behind the rolling barrage, following the .5-minute artillery concentration on the southern edge of Clairs Chênes wood. The Provisional Battalion, 7th Infantry, composed of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, plus about 50 men from Companies B and D, led the attack from the line of departure on the northeastern edge of Bois de la Pultière. Almost immediately heavy machine-gun fire was received from Clairs Chênes wood. Elements of the first wave got through and were able to advance to the northern part of the wood, but no advance in force was made until about 9 a. m., when, in conjunction with the right flank combat group, Companies A and B and the two platoons of Company E, 6th Engineers, were able, by veering to the right, to outflank the enemy in the southwestern edge of the wood. [13, 313, 316, 507]

By noon the second wave of the Provisional Battalion, 7th Infantry, plus the engineer companies, had joined the shattered elements of the first wave in the northern edge of the wood, and the right-flank combat group was making attempts to advance toward Côte 299. A line was organized in the wood, with troops of the 7th Infantry on the right, and the companies of the 6th Engineers on the left. The 5th Division did not advance

as planned, and the enemy began filtering into Clairs Chênes wood from Bois des Rappes. [313, 316, 508]

The troops of the Provisional Battalion, 7th Infantry, were being organized for the attack on Côte 299, and the engineer companies were further consolidating the positions gained in the northern portion of Clairs Chênes wood, when, about 1 p. m., the engineers, believing that their left flank was being turned by the infiltrating enemy, withdrew to the line of departure in the northeastern edge of Bois de la Pultière. This withdrawal forced the withdrawal of the 7th Infantry's troops from Clairs Chênes wood. [13, 316, 509]

The commanding officer, 7th Infantry, took personal command of the withdrawing engineers and the rear elements of the 7th Infantry, and about 3 p. m. commenced another advance through the wood. The troops of the 6th Engineers again attacked in conjunction with the Provisional Battalion, 7th Infantry, and about 4:30 p. m. succeeded in again reaching the northern edge of the wood. The positions were consolidated, and with the aid of a prompt counterbarrage from the division artillery, the troops were able to withstand an enemy counter-attack about 5:30 p. m. [510, 511]

No further attempts were made to take Côte 299 during the day. In the afternoon, patrols of the 4th Infantry attempted to enter the wood at Derrière la Cote de Forêt, but receiving fire from the eastern portion of Bois de Forêt, were forced to retire. After dark Company D, 6th Engineers, came up in Clairs Chênes wood, and wired the new positions gained around the edge of the wood. [512, 513]

The entire wood of Clairs Chênes was held during the night of October 20-21, but a gap of about 500 meters existed between the left of the 3d Division in the northern part of the wood, and the right of the 5th Division in the northern edge of Bois de la Pultière. In the center and on the right, there was no change in the lines. [514]

During the night of October 20-21 the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division relieved the American 33d Division, to the right. Liaison was maintained with the French near the divisional boundary. [515]

At 6 p.m. the III Corps ordered its divisions to complete the preparations directed in its field orders of October 18. [516]

Pursuant to the instructions of the III Corps, the 3d Division ordered an attack on Côte 299, which a later memorandum directed would take place at noon, October 21. The northwestern edge of Bois de Forêt was assigned as the right boundary of the attack, and the divisional left boundary as the left. The troops designated for the attack were: 5th Infantry Brigade; three companies, 6th Engineers; one battalion, 6th Infantry Brigade; and the 7th Machine-Gun Battalion. The 5th Infantry Brigade was responsible for the execution of the attack, with the mission of carrying Côte 299. It was then to consolidate and hold the hill and to push out patrols to the north and east. No rolling barrage was provided, but Côte 299 was to be shelled from 9 a.m. until noon and the northwestern edge of Bois de Forêt was to be heavily shelled during the attack. [517, 518]

Oct. 21 In compliance with the division orders, the 5th Infantry Brigade issued field orders at 2 a.m., October 21, placing the regimental commander of the 7th Infantry in charge of the attack, with the following troops: 7th Infantry; Company E, 4th Infantry; one battalion, 6th Infantry Brigade; 3 companies, 6th Engineers; 7th Machine-Gun Battalion. A combat-liaison group was ordered to cover the ravine between Clairs Chênes wood and Bois des Rappes. The 4th Infantry was ordered to be prepared to extend its lines if the contemplated attack provided the opportunity. [519]

When the attack began, Companies E, A and B, 6th Engineers, were holding the northern part of Clairs Chênes wood. The 6th Infantry Brigade formed a provisional battalion of the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, with Company G and a few men of Company H, 38th Infantry. A detachment of the 7th Infantry was to attack La Mi-Noël wood from positions in the vicinity of La Grève at the same time that the troops of the 38th Infantry attacked Côte 299 from the east side of Clairs Chênes wood. [316, 520, 521]

The attack started about 12:15 p.m., and made such progress on the left that about 1:30 p.m. the two support companies of

the 38th Infantry were sent forward to Côte 299 to consolidate the ground gained. Company D, 4th Infantry, was not used in the attack. During the late afternoon Côte 299 was organized for defense. The attack on La Mi-Noël wood by the detachment of the 7th Infantry had also been successful, and the new line extended around Clairs Chênes wood, thence south-east across the summits of Hill 297 and Côte 299, thence south to the line of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, in Bois de Forêt. [313, 316, 522, 523, 524]

About 3 p. m. the left of the 4th Infantry attempted to push patrols into the small wood to the west of Les Aisements Bois. Although there was no fire from the small wood, heavy fire was received from Les Aisements Bois and the northwestern part of Bois de Forêt, and no gains were made. [313]

About 4 p. m. the enemy made a counterattack from the north and west against the engineer companies which held the extreme left of the line in Clairs Chênes wood. The attack fell principally upon Company B, on the extreme left. Portions of Companies A and E formed a line across the center of the wood, and advanced, pivoting on the western edge of the wood, and cleaning out the few enemy troops who had filtered in from Bois des Rappes. During the night Company D, 6th Engineers, came up and continued wiring the positions in the wood which had been commenced during the night of October 20-21. [525, 526]

At 3:30 p. m. the III Corps ordered the mopping-up of Bois de Forêt on October 22, and the driving in of enemy outposts, with a view to developing his main position. [527]

By 5 p. m. the 5th Division had advanced on the left, and consolidated positions in the northern edge of Bois des Rappes, although contact was not maintained with the 3d Division in Clairs Chênes wood. [499, 528]

The 5th Division was relieved by the 90th Division at 8 a. m., October 22. [529] Oct. 22

At 11 a. m., the 3d Division issued field orders directing an attack on Bois de Forêt at 10 a. m., October 23, and attaching one battalion, 38th Infantry; two battalions, 30th Infantry; and the 7th Machine-Gun Battalion, to the 5th Infantry Bri-

gade for the attack. The provisions of these orders were canceled by the III Corps during the morning, which directed that positions gained would be organized for defense. Advance notice of these instructions was sent to the 5th Infantry Brigade. The formal field orders, giving details of the operation, were received by the brigade at midnight, October 22. [316, 530, 531]

The orders directed that the zone would be organized for security in preparation for further advance. The northern and eastern edges of Bois de Forêt were to be thoroughly organized for defense, and a system of outposts established along the ridge running east and west through Hill 281, Côte 299 and Hill 297. Patrols were to be pushed well to the front to maintain contact with the enemy, and the triangular wood north of Côte 299 was to be reconnoitered with a view to its organization for defense. The 5th Infantry Brigade was charged with the details of the organization, and although the earlier field orders which assigned additional troops to the 5th Infantry Brigade for the projected attack on October 23 were rescinded, these troops were not ordered withdrawn. [532]

The line on the morning of October 22, from right to left, was as follows: northern edge of Bois de la Côte Lémont, held by the 30th Infantry; northern edge of Bois de Briulles, 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry; northeastern edge of Bois de Fays, 2d Battalion, less Company G, 38th Infantry; eastern edge of Bois de Peut-de-Faux and thence northwest through Bois de Forêt, 2d Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry; extending this line generally westward, 1st Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry; along the northern edge of Bois de Forêt and north to and including La Mi-Noël wood, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry; across Côte 299 to Clairs Chênes wood, 1st Battalion, plus Company G, 38th Infantry; Clairs Chênes wood, Companies E, A and B, 6th Engineers. [313, 316, 526, 533, 534, 535]

By 9:30 a. m. the 4th Infantry had patrols moving eastward without opposition 500 meters east of its positions in Bois de Forêt. By 1:45 p. m. the 4th Infantry had extended its lines to include the whole of Bois de Forêt. During the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, reported to the 5th Infantry

Brigade and was attached to the 4th Infantry, being placed in line between the left of the 1st Provisional Battalion, 4th Infantry, and the right of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, reported at this time to the 5th Infantry Brigade as reserve, and remained as such until the relief of the 3d Division, companies of the battalion being used at intervals in support of 5th Infantry Brigade units. During the afternoon Companies I and K, 38th Infantry, were moved from Bois de Briuelles, under command of the 4th Infantry. During the night Company K, 38th Infantry, entered Briuelles with an officer patrol and, finding it unoccupied, remained there during the night of October 23-24. [13, 316, 536, 537]

Before midnight, patrols of both the 4th and 7th Infantry Regiments had reconnoitered Hill 281 and the ridge to the east and found it clear of the enemy. The 4th Infantry was ordered to take the hill and ridge, and planned its attack to start at midnight, October 22. [538, 539]

The line at midnight was unchanged on the extreme right; in the center it included the southern, eastern and northern edges of Bois de Forêt, and extended entirely across Côte 299 and Hill 297. It was unchanged on the extreme left. The 16th Field Artillery was ordered relieved. [271, 540]

At 2 a. m., October 23, the 4th Infantry reported that the attack against Hill 281 and the ridge to the east had succeeded and that the new position had been organized. This position was held by troops of the 4th Infantry and a portion of the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry. [541]

Oct. 23

During the night the 7th Infantry seized the wood north of Côte 299, and west of the Cunel—Cléry-le-Grand road. [542]

During the early morning hours, patrols of the 6th Infantry Brigade occupied Moulin d'en Haut and Tranchée du Teton, but these positions were not held in force during the day. [542, 543]

In the afternoon the patrol of Company K, 38th Infantry, operating under the 4th Infantry, was withdrawn from Briuelles, and Companies I and K, 38th Infantry, remained at the disposal of the 4th Infantry in Bois de Forêt. Company K, 30th Infantry, from the northern edge of Bois de la Côte Lé-

mont, also moved into Briulles, reported it clear of the enemy and then withdrew to its former position in Bois de la Côte Lémont. [13, 533, 544]

No further advance was made during the day. From the northeastern edge of Bois de Forêt, the new line extended northwest up the ridge east of Hill 281, thence along Hill 281, thence northwest around the wood north of Côte 299, thence southwest to the north tip of Clairs Chênes wood. Liaison was maintained to both flanks. [545]

Oct.
24-25

Patrolling was very active on October 24 by all front-line organizations. The enemy was found to have withdrawn north of L'Andon Ruisseau and east of the Meuse in the zone of action of the 3d Division. No changes in line were made during the day. Liaison was not established with the 90th Division, whose right had advanced to a position along the Aincreville-Bantheville road. [313, 316, 546, 547]

At 2 p. m. the 3d Division issued orders which gave details of further organization in depth and assigned to the outpost zone the 5th Infantry Brigade. A slight change was made in the right boundary to a north and south line crossing the front line along vertical grid line 16, thence north and northwest along the left bank of the Meuse. At 8:45 a. m., October 25, the division announced that the situation had changed and that the orders to the 5th Infantry Brigade would not be in effect. [13, 316, 548]

Patrolling continued throughout the 25th but no changes in lines or dispositions were made. [313, 549]

Oct. 26-
Nov. 1

At 1:15 a. m., October 26, the 3d Division issued field orders outlining an attack to be made by the First Army and announcing that the 3d Division was to be in reserve of the III Corps for this action. In orders issued at 9:15 a. m., the relief of the 3d Division, less the 3d Field Artillery Brigade, by the 5th Division was directed. [550]

The relief commenced shortly after dark on the 26th and the last infantry unit was relieved at 4:15 a. m. on the 27th. The artillery brigade remained in support of the 5th Division. The remainder of the 3d Division was assembled in the vicinity of Montfaucon where it passed to the reserve of the III Corps.

On October 30 the division, less artillery, moved to the vicinity of Tronville-en-Barrois and Tannois, near Bar-le-Duc. On November 1 the division was assigned to the reserve of the First Army. [1, 313, 551]

Following the Armistice the division, on November 14, moved to the region south of Champlon where it was joined by the artillery brigade. On November 17 the division, as part of the Army of Occupation, began to move via Remich (Luxemburg) to the district of Mayen, 30 kilometers west of Coblenz, arriving on December 12. On March 9, 1919, the 3d Trench-Mortar Battery sailed from St. Nazaire for the United States. On August 5 the division moved to Brest in preparation for return to the United States. Sailings were begun on August 10. The last elements arrived in the United States on August 28. [1]

Nov. 2,
1918-
Aug. 1919

CASUALTIES, MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

		Sept. 26-29	Sept. 30- Oct. 3	Oct. 4-13	Oct. 14-27	Oct. 28- Nov. 1	Total
<i>3d Division</i>							
4th Inf.	W	5	137	894	414		1,450
	DW		7	52	37		96
	K		36	182	143	3	364
7th Inf.	W	5	107	739	439	5	1,295
	DW		8	56	37		101
	K		43	92	157	2	294
30th Inf.	W	1	33	804	174	5	1,017
	DW		3	60	15		78
	K		7	120	88	1	216
38th Inf.	W	6	7	843	327	4	1,187
	DW		2	62	30		94
	K		2	228	48	3	281
10th FA (Sept. 29-Oct. 26)	W		1	74	28		103
	DW			2	1		3
	K			9	4		13
18th FA (Sept. 29-Oct. 26) (DS Oct. 14-16)	W	1	1	23	17		42
	DW			3	2		5
	K			4	1		5
76th FA (Sept. 29-Oct. 26) (DS Oct. 14-16)	W			147	27		174
	DW			8			8
	K			9	4		13
7th MG Bn.	W		2		30		32
	DW				1		1
	K				15		15
8th MG Bn.	W	2	15	79	80		176
	DW			4	5		9
	K		5	15	13		33
9th MG Bn.	W			103	48	2	153
	DW			9	5		14
	K		5	12	7		24
6th Engrs.	W	10	7	23	174		214
	DW		1	1	13		15
	K		1	3	44		48
Others	W	2	10	77	57	5	151
	DW		2	12	7		21
	K	1	3	22	4		30
Total		33	445	4,771	2,496	30	7,775
<i>Attached Units</i>							
119th FA (32d Div) (Oct. 1-6)	W		11	14			25
	DW		2				2
	K		2				2
120th FA (32d Div) (Oct. 1-6)	W		3	7			10
	DW						
	K			1			1
121st FA (32d Div) (Oct. 1-6)	W		5	2			7
	DW		2				2
	K		1				1
107th Am Tn (32d Div) (Oct. 1-6)	W		1	7			8
	DW			1			1
	K		1	3			4
304th Engrs (79th Div) (Oct. 3-7)	W		3	71			74
	DW			8			8
	K						
147th FA (41st Div) (Oct. 1-6)	W		7	6			13
	DW						
	K			1			1
16th FA (4th Div) (Oct. 14-16) (Oct. 19-22)	W				3		3
	DW						
	K						
2d Bn 13th FA (4th Div) (Oct. 14-16)	W				2		2
	DW						
	K				1		1
Total			38	121	6		165
Aggregate total		33	483	4,892	2,502	30	7,940

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action; DS=detached service.

Appendix

INFANTRY DIVISION (COMBAT) ORGANIZATION IN EFFECT NOVEMBER 11, 1918

Units	Number of units	Strength
Division Headquarters.....	1	304
Infantry Brigades.....	2	
Brigade Headquarters ¹	1 (2)	25 (50)
Infantry Regiment ¹	2 (4)	
Regimental Headquarters ²	1 (4)	6 (24)
Headquarters Company ²	1 (4)	343 (1,372)
Machine-Gun Company ²	1 (4)	178 (712)
Supply Company ²	1 (4)	162 (648)
Infantry Battalions ²	3 (12)	
Battalion Headquarters ³	1 (12)	3 (36)
Rifle Companies ³	4 (48)	3,072 (12,288)
Machine-Gun Battalions ¹	1 (2)	759 (1,518)
Medical Department and Chaplains ¹		127 (254)
Ordnance Department ¹		20 (40)
Veterinary Field Units ¹	1 (2)	4 (8)
Field Artillery Brigade.....	1	
Brigade Headquarters.....	1	79
Regiments, 75-mm Gun.....	2	3,036
Regiments, 155-mm Howitzer.....	1	1,616
Trench-Mortar Battery.....	1	177
Medical Department and Chaplains.....		96
Ordnance Department.....		49
Veterinary Field Units.....	4	16
Machine-Gun Battalion.....	1	
Battalion Headquarters.....	1	30
Machine-Gun Companies.....	2	356
Medical Department.....		7
Ordnance Department.....		2
Engineer Regiment.....	1	1,712
Medical Department and Chaplains.....		31
Ordnance Department.....		6
Field Signal Battalion.....	1	488
Trains.....		3,150
Total.....		28,105

¹ Upper figures indicate number per brigade. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

² Upper figures indicate number per regiment. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

³ Upper figures indicate number per battalion. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

STRENGTH OF 3D DIVISION¹

Units	May 31	June 30	July 31	Aug. 31	Sept. 30	Oct. 31	Nov. 30
4th Inf.....	3,597	3,490	2,499	3,624	3,662	1,843	3,515
7th Inf.....	3,161	2,843	2,587	3,772	3,672	2,263	3,323
30th Inf.....	3,361	3,345	3,700	3,561	3,549	2,132	3,217
38th Inf.....	3,225	3,202	3,649	3,770	3,756	1,879	3,273
7th MG Bn.....	361	395	384	381	385	306	369
8th MG Bn.....	719	742	614	707	780	569	673
9th MG Bn.....	663	709	522	757	763	729	751
Total Inf and MG ²	15,137	14,785	14,003	16,614	16,615	9,766	15,166
10th FA.....	1,184	1,400	1,553	1,317	1,459	1,397	1,479
18th FA.....	1,503	1,569	1,648	1,501	1,633	1,535	1,673
76th FA.....	1,330	1,437	1,487	1,271	1,402	1,358	1,473
Total FA ³	4,139	4,589	4,936	4,339	4,717	4,507	4,850
6th Engrs.....	1,492	1,593	1,248	1,699	1,688	1,282	1,458
Others.....	3,395	3,525	3,771	3,884	4,694	4,353	4,013
Total.....	24,163	24,492	23,958	26,536	27,714	19,908	25,487

¹ Present with the units of the division; does not include absentees.² Includes both infantry brigade headquarters.³ Includes field artillery brigade headquarters and the 3d Trench-Mortar Battery.

GENERAL TABLE OF CASUALTIES

	3d Division	Attached units	Total
Somme Defensive (6th Engineers).....	78	-----	78
Aisne Defensive, Château-Thierry Sector, Champagne-Marne Defensive, Aisne-Marne Offensive and Vesle Sector.....	7,177	94	7,271
Meuse-Argonne Offensive.....	7,775	165	7,940

Sources

The following is a list of the sources on which the statements made in the preceding narrative are based. The numbers refer to the corresponding numbers in brackets at the ends of paragraphs.

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- 19 Field Orders No. 2, 3d Division, May 30.
- 20 Annex to Field Orders No. 2, 3d Division, May 31.
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- 30 Field Orders No. 3, 3d Division, June 1.
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- 33 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 1:20 p. m., June 2.
- 34 Field Message, French 10th Colonial Infantry Division to 38th Infantry,
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- 35 Special Order No. 1157/3, French XXXVIII Corps, June 2.
- 36 War Diary, 30th Infantry, June 3.
- 37 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 3.
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- 39 War Diary, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, June 3-4.
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- 41 Reports of Operations, 7th Machine-Gun Battalion, June 4 and 12.
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- 43 War Diary, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 4.
- 44 Special Order No. 1182/3, French XXXVIII Corps, June 4.
- 45 General Operations Order No. 137, French XXXVIII Corps, June 5.
- 46 Field Orders No. 4, 3d Division, June 6.
- 47 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, June 6.
- 48 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 7.
- 49 Order No. 84/PC, French XXI Corps, June 6.
- 50 General Operations Order No. 138, French XXXVIII Corps, June 7.
- 51 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 8.
- 52 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 9.
- 53 War Diary, 7th Infantry, June 8.
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- 56 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 9-14.
- 57 War Diary, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 10-12.
- 58 War Diary, 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, June 11.
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- 69 G-3 Orders Nos. 16 and 18, 3d Division, June 17-18.
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 - 102 Map attached to Order No. 96, Ia, German 10th Division.
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- 134 Report of Operations, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, July 14-16.
- 135 Report of Operations, Company D, 38th Infantry, July 14-16.
- 136 Report of Operations, 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, July 15.
- 137 Special Order No. 1762/3, French XXXVIII Corps, July 15.
- 138 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 15.
- 139 Report of Operations, Company E, 30th Infantry, July 14-21.
- 140 Report of Operations, 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, July 15-17.
- 141 Report of Operations, Company G, 30th Infantry, July 15-16.
- 142 Report of Operations, Company L, 30th Infantry, July 14-27.
- 143 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, July 15.
- 144 Field Message, 3d Division to 30th Infantry, 7:45 a. m., July 16.
- 145 Kriegstagebuch, German Seventh Army, July 16.
- 146 Order No. 3493, French Sixth Army, July 15.
- 147 Operations Order No. 149, French XXXVIII Corps, July 16.
- 148 G-3 Order No. 136, 3d Division, July 16.
- 149 Field Message, 346th Infantry to 6th Infantry Brigade, 10:40 a. m., July 17.
- 150 Kriegstagebuch, German XXIII Reserve Corps, July 16.
- 151 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, July 16.
- 152 Field Message, 30th Infantry to 111th Infantry, 2:21 p. m., July 16.
- 153 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 8:10 p. m., July 16.
- 154 Patrol Report, 7th Infantry, July 17.
- 155 Kriegstagebuch, German Army Group Crown Prince, July 16.
- 156 Telegrams Nos. 6079/B, 6080/B, French Group of Armies of the Center, July 16.

- 157 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 17.
- 158 Ordre Général No. 562, French III Corps, July 16.
- 159 War Diaries, 1st and 2d Battalions, 111th Infantry, July 17.
- 160 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 10:45 a. m., July 17.
- 161 War Diary, 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, July 17.
- 162 Report of Operations, 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, July 14-27.
- 163 General Order No. 16, War Department, Apr. 5, 1921.
- 164 War Diary, 3d Division, July 18-Aug. 6.
- 165 Kriegstagebuch, German Seventh Army, July 17.
- 166 Telegram No. 940-941/M, French Armies of the North and Northeast, July 17.
- 167 Kriegstagebuch, German Seventh Army, July 18.
- 168 Order No. 1747/3, French Ninth Army, 12:10 a. m., July 18.
- 169 Special Order No. 1794/3, French XXXVIII Corps, July 18.
- 170 Field Orders No. 8, 3d Division, July 18.
- 171 Report of Operations, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, July 17-22.
- 172 War Diaries, 111th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, July 19.
- 173 Kriegstagebuch, German Seventh Army, July 19.
- 174 Telephone Messages, French Ninth Army to French III and XXXVIII Corps, 3:45 p. m., July 19.
- 175 Order No. 2690, 1a, German Group of Armies Crown Prince, July 19.
- 176 Telephone Message, 9 a. m., confirmed by Special Order No. 1837/3, French XXXVIII Corps, July 20.
- 177 General Operations Order No. 154, French XXXVIII Corps, July 20.
- 178 Order No. 3207, 1a, German XXIII Reserve Corps, July 20.
- 179 General Operations Order No. 155, French XXXVIII Corps, July 21.
- 180 Field Orders No. 9, 3d Division, July 21.
- 181 Appendix 3, Report of Operations, 6th Engineers, July 1-31.
- 182 Report of Operations, 4th Infantry, July 14-31.
- 183 Operation Order No. 2261/3, French Ninth Army, July 21.
- 184 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 21.
- 185 General Operations Order No. 156, French XXXVIII Corps, July 21.
- 186 Kriegstagebuch, German XXIII Reserve Corps, July 22.
- 187 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 2 p. m., July 22.
- 188 Operations Order No. 2388/3, French Ninth Army, July 22.
- 189 Report of Operations, French Ninth Army, 11:50 p. m., July 22.
- 190 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 22.
- 191 Summary of Intelligence No. 7059/2, French XXXVIII Corps, July 23.
- 192 General Operations Order No. 157, French XXXVIII Corps, July 22.
- 193 Field Orders No. 10, 3d Division, July 22.
- 194 Report of Operations, 5th Infantry Brigade, July 14-30.
- 195 Operations Order No. 2552/3, French Ninth Army, July 23.
- 196 Special Order No. 1864/3, French XXXVIII Corps, July 23.

- 197 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 23.
- 198 General Operations Order No. 158, French XXXVIII Corps, July 23.
- 199 Field Orders No. 12, 3d Division, July 23.
- 200 Kriegstagebuch, German Army Group Crown Prince, July 21 and 24.
- 201 Telephone Message No. 1880/3, French XXXVIII Corps to 3d Division,
10 p. m., July 24.
- 202 Field Orders No. 13, 3d Division, July 24.
- 203 Field Orders No. 14, 3d Division, July 24.
- 204 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 30th Infantry, 8:20 a. m., July 25.
- 205 Field Messages, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 9:30 a. m. and
10:15 a. m., July 25.
- 206 Field Message, 7th Infantry to 3d Division, no hour, July 25.
- 207 Field Orders No. 11, 84th Infantry Brigade, July 26.
- 208 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 11 a. m., July 25.
- 209 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 25.
- 210 Daily Operations Report No. 2241, French 4th Division, July 25.
- 211 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 11:30 p. m., July 25.
- 212 General Operations Order No. 160, French XXXVIII Corps, July 25.
- 213 General Operations Order No. 161, French XXXVIII Corps, July 25.
- 214 Daily Operations Report No. 2249, French 4th Division, July 26.
- 215 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 26.
- 216 General Operations Order No. 3609, French Sixth Army, July 26.
- 217 General Operations Order No. 164, French XXXVIII Corps, July 26.
- 218 Kriegstagebuch, German Army Group Crown Prince, July 27.
- 219 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 27.
- 220 Field Message, French XXXVIII Corps to 3d Division, 9:50 a. m., July 27.
- 221 Field Message, French XXXVIII Corps to 3d Division, 11:15 a. m.,
July 27.
- 222 G-3 Orders No. 158, 3d Division, July 27.
- 223 Field Orders No. 15, 3d Division, July 27.
- 224 G-3 Order No. 160, 3d Division, July 27.
- 225 Daily Operations Report No. 2279, French 4th Division, July 28.
- 226 General Operations Order No. 165, French XXXVIII Corps, July 27.
- 227 Order No. 1913/3, French XXXVIII Corps, July 27.
- 228 General Operations Order No. 166, French XXXVIII Corps, July 27.
- 229 General Operations Order No. 167, French XXXVIII Corps, July 27.
- 230 Field Orders No. 16, 3d Division, July 28.
- 231 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 2:30 p. m., July 28
- 232 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 28.
- 233 Daily Operations Report No. 2291, French 4th Division, July 28.
- 234 General Operations Order No. 168, French XXXVIII Corps, July 28.
- 235 Field Orders No. 17, 3d Division, July 28.
- 236 Sketch attached to Operations and Intelligence Report, 4th Infantry,
July 29.
- 237 General Operations Order No. 169, French XXXVIII Corps, July 28.
- 238 Field Orders No. 18, 3d Division, July 28.

- 239 Daily Operations Report No. 2301, French 4th Division, July 30.
- 240 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 29.
- 241 Field Message, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 9:45 p. m., July 29.
- 242 Special Order No. 1923/3, French XXXVIII Corps, July 28.
- 243 General Operations Order No. 170, French XXXVIII Corps, July 29.
- 244 Field Orders No. 19, 3d Division, July 29.
- 245 Field Orders No. 23, 32d Division, July 29.
- 246 Army Orders No. 1168, Ia, German Seventh Army, July 28.
- 247 Appendix II, Army Orders No. 1168, Ia, German Seventh Army, July 28.
- 248 Appendix III, Army Orders No. 1168, Ia, German Seventh Army, July 30.
- 249 Kriegstagebuch, German Seventh Army, Aug. 1-3.
- 250 General Operations Order No. 3676, French Sixth Army, Aug. 2.
- 251 Special Order No. 3674, French Sixth Army, Aug. 2.
- 252 Field Orders No. 21, 3d Division, Aug. 2.
- 253 War Diary, 30th Infantry, Aug. 3.
- 254 War Diary, 38th Infantry, Aug. 3.
- 255 Special Order No. 1381/3, French III Corps, Aug. 3.
- 256 Report of Operations, 6th Infantry Brigade, Aug. 2-10.
- 257 Report of Operations, 6th Infantry Brigade, Aug. 12.
- 258 General Order No. 586, French III Corps, Aug. 3.
- 259 Correction to General Order No. 586, French III Corps, Aug. 3.
- 260 War Diaries, 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions, 38th Infantry, and 38th Infantry, Aug. 4.
- 261 War Diary, 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, Aug. 5.
- 262 War Diary, 38th Infantry, Aug. 5.
- 263 Daily Operations Report No. 1452/3, French III Corps, Aug. 5.
- 264 Appendix F1, Report of Operations, 6th Infantry Brigade, Aug. 12.
- 265 War Diary, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, Aug. 5.
- 266 General Operations Order No. 3687, French Sixth Army, Aug. 3.
- 267 Field Orders No. 3, III Corps, Aug. 4.
- 268 Field Orders No. 6, III Corps, Aug. 5.
- 269 Report of Operations, Company C, 38th Infantry, Aug. 5-9.
- 270 Field Message, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, to 38th Infantry, 6:50 p. m., Aug. 6.
- 271 War Diary, 4th Field Artillery Brigade, Oct. 22-24.
- 272 Field Messages, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, to Company C, 38th Infantry, 7:20 a. m. and 7 p. m., Aug. 6.
- 273 Telegrams Nos. 1734/M and 1741/M, French Armies of the North and Northeast, Aug. 6.
- 274 Field Orders No. 10, III Corps, Aug. 6.
- 275 History of the Third Army Corps, Vol. I.
- 276 Field Orders No. 1, 6th Infantry Brigade, Aug. 7.
- 277 Report of Operations, 6th Engineers, Aug. 10.

- 278 Field Messages, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, to Company C, 5:30 p. m.; Company B, 5:35 p. m.; Company A, 5:40 p. m.; Company D, 6:30 p. m.; 38th Infantry, 6:30 p. m. and 7:40 p. m.; and 6th Infantry Brigade, 9 p. m., Aug. 7.
- 279 Field Message, 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, to 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, 6:55 p. m., Aug. 7.
- 280 Report of Operations, French 4th Division, Aug. 8.
- 281 Field Messages, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, to 6th Infantry Brigade, 9:12 p. m. and no hour, Aug. 7; Companies B and C, 1:15 a. m., Aug. 8.
- 282 Field Orders No. 11, III Corps, Aug. 8.
- 283 Field Message, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, to Company B, 7:50 p. m., Aug. 8.
- 284 G-3 Orders No. 3, III Corps, Aug. 8.
- 285 Field Orders No. 12, III Corps, Aug. 9.
- 286 G-3 Orders No. 6, III Corps, Aug. 9.
- 287 Special Order No. 692/3, French 164th Division, Aug. 9.
- 288 Unnumbered Orders, 6th Infantry Brigade, 6:20 p. m., Aug. 9.
- 289 Unnumbered Orders, 6th Infantry Brigade, noon, Aug. 10.
- 290 Report of Operations, French 164th Division, Aug. 11.
- 291 War Diaries, 3d and 32d Divisions, Aug. 11.
- 292 General Order No. 588, French III Corps, Aug. 4.
- 293 Directive, Allied Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 3.
- 294 Letter, Allied Commander-in-Chief to American Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 23.
- 295 Field Orders No. 18, III Corps, Sept. 21.
- 296 Field Orders No. 31, First Army, Sept. 29.
- 297 Field Orders No. 47, V Corps, Sept. 29.
- 298 Field Orders No. 44, 3d Division, Sept. 30.
- 299 Field Orders No. 31, V Corps, Sept. 21.
- 300 War Diary, 4th Infantry, Sept. 30.
- 301 Report of Operations, 3d Division, Oct. 2-26.
- 302 War Diary, 57th Field Artillery Brigade, Sept. 30-Oct. 6.
- 303 Situation Sketch, 4th Infantry, Oct. 1.
- 304 War Diary, 7th Infantry, Oct. 2.
- 305 Daily Operations Report, 7th Infantry, Oct. 2.
- 306 War Diary, 304th Engineers, Oct. 2-6.
- 307 Field Orders Nos. 55 and 56, V Corps, Oct. 3.
- 308 G-3 Memorandum, V Corps, Oct. 3.
- 309 Field Orders, No. 45, 32d Division, Oct. 3.
- 310 Daily Operations Reports, 125th and 318th Infantry Regiments, Oct. 3.
- 311 Field Orders No. 9, 5th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 3.
- 312 War Diary, 7th Infantry, Oct. 4.
- 313 Report of Operations, 3d Division, Sept. 30-Oct. 26.
- 314 Field Message, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, to 7th Infantry, 7:27 a. m., Oct. 4.

- 315 Report of French Tank Commander (assault artillery), Oct. 5.
- 316 Report of Operations, 5th Infantry Brigade, Sept. 4–Nov. 2.
- 317 Report of Operations, 32d Division, Sept. 29–Oct. 20.
- 318 Field Message, 7th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 12:35 p. m., Oct. 4.
- 319 Daily Operations Report, 7th Infantry, Oct. 5.
- 320 Field Message, 15th Tank Battalion (French) to 3d Division, 5:35 p. m., Oct. 4.
- 321 Field Message, 80th Division to 3d Division, 9:35 p. m., Oct. 4.
- 322 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 6:40 p. m., Oct. 4.
- 323 Daily Operations Report, V Corps, Oct. 1.
- 324 Situation Map, 3d Division, Oct. 4.
- 325 Field Message, 3d Division to 32d Division, 9:10 p. m., Oct. 4.
- 326 Situation Tracing, 7th Infantry, Oct. 5.
- 327 Situations Tracings, German West Meuse Group, Oct. 4.
- 328 Field Orders No. 58, V Corps, Oct. 4.
- 329 Field Orders No. 46, 3d Division, Oct. 4.
- 330 Daily Operations Report, 3d Division, Oct. 5–6.
- 331 War Diary, 4th Infantry, Oct. 5.
- 332 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 11 p. m., Oct. 5.
- 333 Situation Map, 3d Division, Oct. 5.
- 334 Daily Situation Report, 7th Infantry, Oct. 5.
- 335 War Diary, 7th Infantry, Oct. 5.
- 336 Field Message Sketch, 7th Infantry Liaison Officer, 5th Infantry Brigade, to 5th Infantry Brigade, 4:15 p. m., Oct. 5.
- 337 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, to 7th Infantry, 7:30 p. m., Oct. 5.
- 338 Field Message, Liaison Officer, 32d Division, to 3d Division, 8:10 p. m., Oct. 5.
- 339 Field Message, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 9:30 p. m., Oct. 5.
- 340 Situation Tracing, 32d Division, Oct. 6.
- 341 Situation Tracing, German West Meuse Group, 8 a. m., Oct. 6.
- 342 Field Orders No. 48, 3d Division, Oct. 5.
- 343 Field Orders No. 62, V Corps, Oct. 5.
- 344 Field Message, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 7 a. m., Oct. 6.
- 345 Field Message, 3d Division to 80th Division, 8:30 a. m., Oct. 6.
- 346 Field Message, 7th Infantry to 3d Division, 9:07 a. m., Oct. 6.
- 347 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 32d Division, 11:45 a. m., Oct. 6.
- 348 Summary of Intelligence No. 53, 3d Division, Oct. 6–7.
- 349 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 5:15 p. m., Oct. 7.
- 350 Report of Liaison Officer, 3d Division, to Commanding Officer, 3d Division, Oct. 6.
- 351 War Diary, 3d Division, Oct. 6.
- 352 Reports of Investigation, 4th Infantry Attack on Bois de Cunel, Oct. 8.
- 353 Field Messages, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 9:30 a. m. and 7:25 p. m., Oct. 7.
- 354 Field Orders No. 50, (G-3, 44) 3d Division, Oct. 7.

- 355 Field Orders No. 64, V Corps, Oct. 7.
- 356 Daily Operations Report, 30th Infantry, Oct. 7-8.
- 357 War Diary, 38th Infantry, Oct. 8.
- 358 Field Message, Company H, 38th Infantry, to 38th Infantry, 7 a. m., Oct. 8.
- 359 Daily Operations Report, 3d Division, Oct. 8-9.
- 360 Field Orders No. 51, 3d Division, Oct. 8.
- 361 Report of Operations, 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, July 14-Aug. 2.
- 362 Field Orders No. 66, V Corps, Oct. 8.
- 363 Field Orders No. 49, 3d Division, Oct. 8.
- 364 Field Orders No. 16, 6th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 8.
- 365 Field Message, 63d Infantry Brigade to 32d Division, 1:30 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 366 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 9:30 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 367 Field Message, 3d Division to 6th Infantry Brigade, 2:45 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 368 Field Message, 30th Infantry to 3d Division, 9:52 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 369 Field Message, 38th Infantry to 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 5:15 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 370 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, to Companies L and M, 38th Infantry, 7 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 371 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, to 3d Division, 1:40 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 372 Field Message, G-2, 3d Division, to 3d Division, 1:13 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 373 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, to 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, 1:15 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 374 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 2:20 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 375 Daily Operations Report, 80th Division, Oct. 9-10.
- 376 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 3:20 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 377 Telephone Messages, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 6:40 p. m. and 7 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 378 Field Orders No. 52, 3d Division, Oct. 9.
- 379 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 7th Infantry, 6:55 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 380 Field Message, 30th Infantry to 3d Division, 7:53 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 381 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, to Company M, 38th Infantry, 10:30 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 382 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, to Company L, 38th Infantry, 11:08 a. m., Oct. 9.
- 383 Field Messages, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 12:55 p. m., 1:05 p. m. and 1:30 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 384 Telephone Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 8:30 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 385 Field Message, 32d Division to 3d Division, 2:10 p. m., Oct. 9.
- 386 Telephone Message, French Ninth Army to French Fifth Army, 2:55 p. m., July 24.
- 387 Field Orders No. 67, V Corps, Oct. 9.
- 388 Telephone Message, 3d Division, to 6th Infantry Brigade, 11:55 p. m., Oct. 9.

- 389 Field Orders No. 52, 3d Division, Oct. 9.
390 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 11:05 a. m., Oct. 10.
391 Daily Situation Report, 38th Infantry, Oct. 10.
392 Daily Operations Report, 3d Division, Oct. 10-11.
393 Field Message, Liaison Officer, 3d Division, to 3d Division, 6 p. m., Oct. 10.
394 Field Orders No. 69, V Corps, Oct. 10.
395 Field Orders No. 53, 3d Division, Oct. 10.
396 Summary of Intelligence, 3d Division, Oct. 10-11.
397 War Diary, 7th Infantry, Oct. 11.
398 Field Messages, Liaison Officer to 3d Division, 7:10 a. m. and 7:50 a. m., Oct. 11.
399 Field Messages, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 4:45 a. m., 8:15 a. m. and 11:05 a. m., Oct. 11.
400 Field Message, 4th Infantry to 3d Division, 8:15 a. m., Oct. 11.
401 Daily Operations Report, 7th Infantry, Oct. 11-12.
402 Field Message, 30th Infantry to 3d Division, 5:45 a. m., Oct. 11.
403 Field Message, 3d Division to 80th Division, 8:51 a. m., Oct. 11.
404 Field Message, Liaison Group, 3d Division, to 3d Division, 12 M, Oct. 11.
405 Field Message, 3d Division to 80th Division, 12:45 p. m., Oct. 11.
406 Field Message, 80th Division to 3d Division, 1:40 p. m., Oct. 11.
407 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 12:15 p. m., Oct. 11.
408 Field Message, Liaison Group, 3d Division, to 3d Division, 1:15 p. m., Oct. 11.
409 Field Message, 7th Infantry to 6th Infantry Brigade, 2:30 p. m., Oct. 11.
410 Field Messages, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 8:30 a. m. and 2:30 p. m., Oct. 11.
411 Field Message, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, to 38th Infantry, 12:05 p. m., Oct. 11.
412 Field Message, 7th Infantry to 38th Infantry, 1:35 p. m., Oct. 11.
413 Field Message, Company H, 30th Infantry, to 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, 1:20 p. m., Oct. 11.
414 Field Message, 38th Infantry to 3d Division, 7:10 a. m., Oct. 11.
415 Field Message, Observation Post, 38th Infantry, to 38th Infantry, 7:35 a. m., Oct. 11.
416 Field Messages, 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, to 38th Infantry, 8:30 a. m., 5:20 p. m. and 5:35 p. m., Oct. 11.
417 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, to 38th Infantry, 12 M, Oct. 11.
418 Daily Operations and Situation Reports, 38th Infantry, Oct. 11-12.
419 Field Message, 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, to 3d Division, 2:30 p. m., Oct. 11.
420 Field Orders No. 70, V Corps, Oct. 11.
421 Field Orders No. 54, 3d Division, Oct. 11.
422 Field Message, 3d Division to V Corps, 3:45 a. m., Oct. 12.
423 War Diary, 3d Division, Oct. 12.
424 Daily Operations Report, 3d Division, Oct. 12-13.
425 Report o Operations, 32d Division, Sept. 26-Nov. 11.

- 426 Field Orders No. 61, First Army, Oct. 12.
- 427 Field Orders No. 71, V Corps, Oct. 12.
- 428 History of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade, undated.
- 429 Daily Operations Report, III Corps, Oct. 13.
- 430 Field Orders No. 28, III Corps, Oct. 13.
- 431 Field Orders No. 55, 3d Division, Oct. 12.
- 432 Daily Situation Report, 4th Division, Oct. 12-13.
- 433 Field Message, 3d Division to Liaison Group, 3d Division, 6:35 p. m., Oct. 12.
- 434 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 6:20 a. m., Oct. 13.
- 435 Situation Tracing, 5th Infantry Brigade, 11 a. m., Oct. 13.
- 436 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 5 p. m., Oct. 13.
- 437 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 5 p. m., Oct. 13.
- 438 War Diary, 7th Infantry, Oct. 13.
- 439 Daily Operations Report, 38th Infantry, Oct. 13.
- 440 Daily Operations Report, 7th Infantry, Oct. 13.
- 441 Field Message, III Corps to 3d Division, 10:15 a. m., Oct. 13.
- 442 Field Messages, 6th Infantry Brigade to 5th Infantry Brigade, 5 p. m., and to 3d Division, 3:55 p. m., Oct. 13.
- 443 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 7:55 p. m., Oct. 13.
- 444 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 24.
- 445 Field Orders No. 56, 3d Division, Oct. 13.
- 446 Field Orders No. 55, 5th Division, Oct. 13.
- 447 Field Message, Liaison Officer, 5th Division, to 3d Division, 9:15 a. m., Oct. 14.
- 448 Daily Situation Report, 38th Infantry, Oct. 14.
- 449 Field Messages, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 9:30 a. m., 11:35 a. m., 11:58 a. m. and 2:02 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 450 Field Message, Liaison Officer, 5th Division, to 3d Division, 12:56 a. m., Oct. 14.
- 451 Field Message, 3d Division to 5th Infantry Brigade (no hour), Oct. 14.
- 452 Field Message, 3d Division to 6th Infantry Brigade, 10:47 a. m., Oct. 14.
- 453 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 12:45 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 454 Field Message, 38th Infantry to 6th Infantry Brigade, 5:30 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 455 Field Message, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 12:16 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 456 Field Messages, 30th Infantry to 3d Division, 2:40 p. m., and 3:40 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 457 Field Message, Provisional Company, 30th Infantry, to 30th Infantry, 6:20 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 458 Field Message, Liaison Officer, 5th Division, to 3d Division, 5:45 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 459 Telephone Message, 3d Division to III Corps, 3:10 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 460 Field Message, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 5:20 p. m., Oct. 14.
- 461 Verbal Report, Commanding General, 5th Infantry Brigade, to Commanding General, 3d Division, 9:10 a. m., Oct. 15.

- 462 Field Orders No. 29, III Corps, Oct. 14.
- 463 Field Orders No. 67, 3d Division, Oct. 14.
- 464 G-3 Memorandum No. 344, 3d Division, Oct. 14.
- 465 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 9:10 a. m., Oct. 15.
- 466 Daily Operations Report, 4th Infantry, Oct. 15.
- 467 Field Message, 7th Infantry to 3d Division, 9:20 a. m., Oct. 15.
- 468 Field Messages, 4th Infantry to 3d Division, 11:04 a. m. and 1 p. m., Oct. 15.
- 469 Field Messages, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 12:40 p. m. and 1 p. m., Oct. 15.
- 470 Field Message, 7th Infantry to 3d Division, 12:15 p. m., Oct. 15.
- 471 Field Message, 4th Infantry to 5th Infantry Brigade, 11 a. m., Oct. 15.
- 472 Daily Operations Report, 38th Infantry, Oct. 15.
- 473 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 9:40 p. m., Oct. 15.
- 474 Field Orders No. 58, 3d Division, Oct. 15.
- 475 War Diary, 30th Infantry, Oct. 16.
- 476 Daily Operations Report, 30th Infantry, Oct. 16.
- 477 Daily Operations Report, 38th Infantry, Oct. 16.
- 478 Field Message, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, to 38th Infantry, 11:26 a. m., Oct. 16.
- 479 Field Message, 3d Division to III Corps, 3:30 p. m., Oct. 16.
- 480 Field Orders No. 30, III Corps, Oct. 16.
- 481 Field Orders No. 59, 3d Division, Oct. 16.
- 482 Field Orders No. 31, III Corps, Oct. 16.
- 483 Field Orders No. 60, 3d Division, Oct. 16.
- 484 Field Orders No. 10, 5th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 16.
- 485 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 2:45 p. m., Oct. 16.
- 486 Daily Operations Report, 38th Infantry, Oct. 17.
- 487 Field Messages, 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry to 11th Infantry, 5:30 p. m., Oct. 17, and 8:30 a. m., Oct. 18.
- 488 Daily Operations Reports, 7th Infantry, Oct. 17 and 18.
- 489 Situation Map, 3d Division, Oct. 16.
- 490 Field Messages, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 3:45 p. m., 8:50 p. m., and 8:53 p. m., Oct. 17.
- 491 Field Message, 3d Division to 5th Infantry Brigade, 9:20 p. m., Oct. 17.
- 492 Field Orders No. 32, III Corps, Oct. 17.
- 493 Field Message, 3d Division to Air Service, 6:30 p. m., Oct. 18.
- 494 Field Message, 6th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 5:25 a. m., Oct. 19.
- 495 War Diary, 38th Infantry, Oct. 19.
- 496 War Diary, 7th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 19.
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 - 544 Field Message, 5th Infantry Brigade to 3d Division, 4:50 p. m., Oct. 23.
 - 545 Daily Operations Report, 3d Division, Oct. 24.
 - 546 Field Message, 3d Battalion, 358th Infantry, to 358th Infantry, 5:30 p. m., Oct. 24.
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 - 552 Letter, Commanding Officer, 6th Engineers, to Commanding General, 3d Division, Subject: "Brief History of 6th Engineers", Sept. 1.
 - 553 Daily Operations Report, French 125th Division, July 15.
 - 554 Instruction No. 14546, French Armies of the North and Northeast, July 12.
 - 555 Letter No. 2053, Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies, July 13.
 - 556 Kriegstagebuch, German XXIII Reserve Corps, July 20.
 - 557 Telephone Message, 3d Division to 30th Infantry, 7:30 a. m., July 24.
 - 558 Report of Operations, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, July 23-27.
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